Chang 2010: 23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism: Notes failures of neoliberalism and suggests utility of partial state planning from a non-socialist leftist perspective: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/987077586 https://u1lib.org/book/888686/6099ba https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/981774591070466058/chang2003.pdf

Piketty 2014: Capital in the 21st Century: Reviews wealth accumulation, inequality, and growth (mostly) from 1800's to 2000's from a non-Marxist socialist perspective: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/907929202 https://u1lib.org/book/2329124/3da90d https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/981775295294079006/piketty2014.pdf

Nitzan and Bichler 2009: Capital as Power: Argues that the chief source of inequality and oppression is hierarchy; argues against the neoclassical util and the Marxian LTV: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/474177103 https://u1lib.org/book/884514/cb3e0f https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/787343598810824755/nitzan2009.pdf https://blairfix.github.io/capital_as_power/the-marxist-entanglement-i-values-and-prices.html

Mazzacuto 2013: The Entrepreneurial State: Reviews the role of the state in spurring and spreading innovation from a non-socialist left perspective: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1057143319 https://u1lib.org/book/5218819/c937e7 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/981776625077211166/mazzacuto2013.pdf

Chang and Grabel 2013: Reclaiming Development: demonstrates how the development successes of East Asia rebuked neoliberalism and emberaced the developmental state model: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1295102610 https://u1lib.org/book/17038508/1d0516 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/981773493022646272/chang2013.pdf

Roosevelt and Belkin eds 1994: Why Market Socialism?: An anthology of various market socialisms, their strengths and weaknesses, and preferability to capitalist or planned socialist models: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/847428055 https://u1lib.org/book/21149358/59ddce https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/960977013479444500/roosevelt1994.pdf

Schweickart 2011: After Capitalism: argues for Economic Democracy, a socialist market system, as superior to capitalism: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1064064432 https://u1lib.org/book/5558600/b5b825 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/827934025355624498/schweickart2011.pdf

Roemer 1996: Equal Shares: argues for a specific vision of market socialism, and features several responses and elaborations: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/246257676 https://u1lib.org/book/21313718/5cc6e1 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/982123364468551710/roemer1996.pdf

Roemer 1994: A Future for Socialism: argues that positive freedom and equality of opportunity are the hallmarks of socialism, argues that market socialism is both socialist and efficient, from an Analytic Marxist perspective: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/868620097 https://u1lib.org/book/3405993/b5bc91 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/782280842231414785/roemer1994.pdf

Ellman 2014: Socialist Planning: reviews the commonalities and differences, successes and failures of socialist planning schemes, from a very critical new Keynesian synthesis perspective: https://u1lib.org/book/2481030/a891e5 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/858786911140053022/ellman2014.pdf

Phillips and Rozworski 2019: The People's Republic of Walmart: light reading by non-economists who suggest that the internal central planning of most companies suggests socialist central planning is plausible: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1110266691 https://u1lib.org/book/3705952/801cf6 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/858787271905116210/phillips2019.pdf

Cockshott and Zachariah 2012: Arguments for Socialism: argues for socialist central planning based on cybernetic information-gathering, integrated labor values, and labor-vouchers, from a modern Marxist perspective: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/822653611 http://web.archive.org/web/20220602043741/http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/58987/1/58987.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/858789425655578664/cockshott2012.pdf

Cockshott and Cottrell 1993: Toward a New Socialism: argues for socialist central planning based on cybernetic information-gathering, integrated labor values, and labor-vouchers, from a modern Marxist perspective: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/30013843 http://web.archive.org/web/20211120013850/http://users.wfu.edu/cottrell/socialism_book/new_socialism.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/858788472592400384/cockshott1993.pdf

Dow 2018: The Labor-Managed Firm: Theoretical Foundations: todo reread xxx: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1158285240 https://u1lib.org/book/11651644/7e6e3d https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/862791546222805062/dow2018.pdf

Wolff 2012: Democracy At Work: todo reread xxx: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/816252434 https://u1lib.org/book/3608872/446022 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/982731886621245510/wolff2012.pdf

Lavoie 2009: Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics: provides an overview of and introduction to post-Keynesian economic theory: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1146503455 https://u1lib.org/book/2680584/da376f https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/897343060948705331/lavoie2009.pdf

Robinson 1974: Economic Philosophy: reviews contemporary post-Keynesian approach to economics: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/862350171 https://u1lib.org/book/2445823/472a30 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/782291801570672660/robinson1974.pdf

Roemer 1981: Analytical Foundations of Marxian Economic Theory: Analytic Marxist provides neoclassical-type micro-foundations to support Marxian economics: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/7334288601 https://u1lib.org/book/989975/7d7f98 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/858791899032453131/roemer1981.pdf

Roemer 1988: Free to Lose: Analytic Marxist shows that labor theory of value isn't necessary to prove that exploitation exists, shows that unequal capital ownership is sufficient to automatically create class: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/753279231 https://u1lib.org/book/815428/4e2811 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/782280843875319808/roemer1988.pdf

Acemoglu and Robinson 2019: The Narrow Corridor: SocDem / ProgLib perspective: Reviews why democracy has thrived within the "narrow corridor" of dual growth of both civil society power and state power: https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1243502552 https://u1lib.org/book/5249362/17190a https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/765054182217613322/AcemogluRobinson2019.pdf

Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: Why Nations Fail: SocDem / ProgLib perspective: Argues that growth is caused by good institutions, which are strong democracy, markets, and private property: https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/805356561 https://u1lib.org/book/3496727/072ca5 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/966537778177380392/acemoglu2012.pdf

Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018: How Democracies Die: ProgLib perspective: Reviews the institutional causes of democratic breakdown. https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1193287439 https://u1lib.org/book/2826730/2c8632 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/966538456140484628/levitsky2018.pdf

Friedman 2019: The History of American Law: lib perspective: Reviews the origins and development of laws in the postcolonial and industrializing USA: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1224069402 https://u1lib.org/book/14621549/d18afd https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/981780275782639706/friedman2019.pdf

Hersh 2020: Politics Is For Power: argues that "political hobbyism" and "postmaterialism" are ineffective while local citizen organizing is effective at achieving political power & change, from a ProgLib perspective: https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1140364591 https://u1lib.org/book/5409346/01788b https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/966535310794182706/Hersh2016.pdf

Chenowith and Stephan 2011: Why Civil Resistance Works: argues that nonviolent movements are more successful than violent ones at achieving similar goals, from a ProgLib perspective: https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/818128687 https://u1lib.org/book/3656840/d89e0d https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/713784950964355132/ChenowethAndStephan2011.pdf

Rutherford 2020: How to Argue With A Racist: geneticist reviews the arguments for scientific anti-racism: https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1228315214 https://u1lib.org/book/5406846/1a86f7 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/736771760371793940/rutherford2020.pdf

Saini 2019: Superior: The Return of Race Science: science journalist reviews the arguments for scientific anti-racism: https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1280055217 https://u1lib.org/book/5006291/101c4c https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/957704007718162472/saini2019.pdf

Roberts 2020: Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business Re-Create Race in the Twenty-First Century: lawyer reviews the arguments for scientific anti-racism: https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1197789687 https://u1lib.org/book/3705434/5ab5d9 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/958634610449870948/roberts2020.pdf

Foner 2017: Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877: reivews the current historical view on Reconstruction, which is of a racist backlash that thwarted the potentially radical land reform and political reform against the Southern aristocracy: todotodotodo: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1118485852 https://u1lib.org/book/2660897/0b8229 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/988589075873280090/foner2017.pdf

Cohen 2000: Karl Marx's Theory of History: defends the defensible portions of Karl Marx's historical materialism through analytical Marxism: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1112843222 https://u1lib.org/book/848583/b5df69 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1004536562341650452/cohen2000.pdf https://u1lib.org/book/11120334/05e360 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1004536562605899947/cohen2020.epub

Allen 2009: Farm to Factory: Reviews economic growth in the Soviet Union; suggests central planning excelled at extensive growth in the 20's-60's; suggests central planning failed at intensive growth in the 70's-80's; and that growth was dramatically slowed by political failure: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/799521398 https://u1lib.org/book/2606184/eda7a0 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/858785806578876457/allen2009.pdf

Peters 2016: How Not to Network a Nation: reviews the failure of the USSR to adopt internetted communication and computerized planning: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/981566746 https://u1lib.org/book/2729819/021dc8 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/858785800857714738/peters2019.pdf

The central proposition that this book develops and then complicates is that although the American ARPANET initially took shape thanks to well-managed state subsidies and collaborative research environments, the comparable Soviet network projects stumbled due to widespread unregulated competition among self-interested institutions, bureaucrats, and other key actors. The first global civilian computer networks developed among cooperative capitalists, not among competitive socialists. The capitalists behaved like socialists while the socialists behaved like capitalists.

Spufford 2012: Red Plenty: fictionally reviews the failure of the USSR to adopt internetted communication and computerized planning: http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/953620305 https://u1lib.org/book/993327/6085e0 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/778117660042723328/spufford2010.pdf

Innuendo Studios: socialist, mostly current affairs: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC5fdssPqmmGhkhsJi4VcckA

Three Arrows: socialist, mostly historical discussions: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCT8a7d6S6RJUivBgNRsiYg

donoteat01: socialist, mostly historical discussions: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCFdazs-6CNzSVv1J0a-qy4A

Srsly Wrong: socialist, wide theoretical analysis: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCam_6nCM4Yd-zmAOz6IYLNg

Halim Alrah: socialist, mostly theoretical analysis:

Cuck Philosophy: socialist, mostly theoretical analysis: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCSkzHxIcfoEr69MWBdo0ppg

Paul Cockshott: socialist, mostly theoretical analysis: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCVBfIU1_zO-P_R9keEGdDHQ

hbomberguy: socialist, mostly cultural discussions: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UClt01z1wHHT7c5lKcU8pxRQ

Jos : socialist, mostly cultural discussions: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCeDKIj0G5XbultKOQnacu_w

The Moa: socialist, mostly cultural discussions: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCSQHoO6ByppH6Ldr0pdytFA

Contrapoints: socialist, mostly cultural discussions: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCNvsIonJdJ5E4EXMa65VYpA

PhilosophyTube: socialist, mostly cultural discussions: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC2PA-AKmVpU6NKCGtZq_rKQ

Folding Ideas: socialist, mostly cultural discussions: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCyNtlmLB73-7gtlBz00XOQQ

LastWeekTonight: socdem, mostly current affairs: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC3XTzVzaHQEd30rQbuvCtTQ

Robert Reich: socdem, mostly current affairs: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCuDv5p8E-evaRSh542hDV5g

Knowing Better: socdem, mostly historical analysis: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC8XjmAEDVZSCQjI150cb4QA

Internet Comment Etiquette: socdem, mostly current affairs: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCyWDmyZRjrGHeKF-ofFsT5Q

C0nc0rdance: ProgLib, mostly current affairs: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCPFnHiJx1P9UY05_F9sOu1g

Riley Grace Roshong: ProgLib, mostly social-left issues: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC72V_10TPhNUkJMdy5HMAEg

V-DEM metric: democracy (a complex and large number of metrics, broadly encompassing access to power, competition for power, and democratic-liberal freedoms) has greatly increased over time: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-democracies-row?country=~OWID_WRL

POLITY-4: metric: democracy (defined as open political competition for the executive & legislative & judicial power in a country) has greatly increased over time: https://ourworldindata.org/democracy

V-DEM metric: democracy (see above) is concentrated among high- and middle-income countries, especially in the Americas, Europe, Southern Africa, East Asia, and Oceania: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/political-regime

economist democracy index (flawed metric) by country: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index

Rummel 1995: using a bad metric of democracy, strong democracies and strong civil rights correlate with many times fewer killings by the government: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002795039001001 http://sci-hub.se/10.1177/0022002795039001001 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/758088118711615499/rummel1995.pdf

Acemoglu 2018: democracy increases economic growth: countries that transition to democracy see substantially higher growth afterward: http://www.nber.org/papers/w20004.pdf https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/700936 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/758088115549241444/acemoglu2018.pdf

Our index of democracy combines information from several datasets, including Freedom House and Polity IV, and only codes a country as democratic when several sources agree. The full construction of our measure is explained in detail in the Appendix, and we just provide an overview here. We code our dichotomous measure of democracy in country c at time t, Dct, as follows. First, we code a country as democratic during a given year if: Freedom House codes it as Free , or Partially Free and it receives a positive Polity IV score.

POLITY-5: consistent democracies and consistent autocracies are about equally stable; mixed systems are much less stable: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/PTfig03.htm https://archive.ph/xnbRJ

leftists are more supportive of democracy than rightists or centrists: NYT: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/23/opinion/international-world/centrists-democracy.html http://archive.is/UX2L5 Study: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fOGwtRUF-y-98IcDs-3YYrtREl8GbaoH/view

^ possible response: http://web.archive.org/web/20180613175008/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/12/not-centrists-but-radicals-and-extremists-are-more-hostile-to-democracy/?utm_term=.a84645f2754f

29% of Americans think direct democracy is "very good", 38% "somewhat good", 19% "somewhat bad", and 12% "very bad" http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/11/07/europe-north-america-publics-more-supportive-than-experts-of-direct-democracy/

Foa and Mounk 2016 claim that support for democracy has dramatically declined: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-danger-of-deconsolidation-the-democratic-disconnect/

this only occurs when looking at one response (10 out of 10): in reality, the mean score for "How important is living in a democracy?" is virtually unchanged from 2006 to 2017: https://jacobinmag.com/2018/02/public-opinion-democracy-authoritarianism-populism-trump

true democracy requires that the people be able to "set" the political agenda themselves: http://blog.felixbreuer.net/2011/11/21/mckelvey.html

vTaiwan usefully converts citizen suggestions about a proposed law into "blocs" of agreeing and differing opinion, allowing legislators to better tailor laws: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611816/the-simple-but-ingenious-system-taiwan-uses-to-crowdsource-its-laws/amp/ https://pol.is/3phdex2kjf

basic math allows for direct votes on expenditure and taxation: https://paulcockshott.wordpress.com/2017/02/03/socialism-and-direct-democracy/

on average, studies find that US presidents keep about 67% of their promises: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trust-us-politicians-keep-most-of-their-promises/ [unformatted reread]

Japanese one-party rule incorporated the nuclear industry, which resulted in less powerful and less transparent regulation: https://www.cairn.info/revue-annales-historiques-de-l-electricite-2003-1-page-133.htm https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/727595692201214012/AHE_001_0133.pdf

In Japan, there is considerable stress on voluntary compliance with nuclear regulations, which are less strict in the critical plant operating stage.

And it is the reasons for this behind the scenes collaboration that must be analyzed here, based upon the gap between theory and practice in the case of Japanese nuclear regulation. First of all, while Japan s Diet [Parliament] was, in theory, based upon an open multi-party parliamentary system, in practice, it acquired a centralized Byzantine-like nature based upon a party-political machine , i.e. the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that was essentially unresponsive to changing or competing interests and changes in the composition of interest groups. The desire of LDP beneficiaries such as the Japanese nuclear-industrial complex were facilitated by governmental organizations with which they were closely linked. What occurred in Japan, therefore, was that the centralized government agencies regulating nuclear power, MITI and NSC (Nuclear Safety Commission), simply collaborated on safety issues to the benefit of the Japanese nuclear-industrial complex. Secondly, in Japan, not only were the parliamentary and regulatory structures centralized, but the nature of the domestic power interests industries and utilities was also monolithic and uncompetitive.

populist rule correlates with a 15.3% decline in a country's Polity IV democracy score; each year of populist rule correlates with a 30.3% decline: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/ https://institute.global/policy/populist-harm-democracy-empirical-assessment

rate of democratic backsliding by ideology was basically indifferent: of 13 right-wing populists, 5 (38.5%) backslid; of 15 left-wing, 5 (33.3%) backslid; of 17 unclassified (often centrist), 5 (29.4%) backslid: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/ https://institute.global/policy/populist-harm-democracy-empirical-assessment

Between 1990 and 2014, 13 right-wing populist governments were elected; of these, five have significantly curtailed civil liberties and political rights, as measured by Freedom House. Over the same period, 15 left-wing populist governments were elected; of these, the same number reduced such freedoms. (Over the same period, there were also 17 populist governments that cannot easily be classified as either right- or left-wing; again, five of these governments diminished civil liberties and political rights.) Although this indicates a slightly higher rate of backsliding among right-wing populists than left-wing ones (38 per cent vs. 33 per cent), these data clearly contradict the belief that left-wing populism does not pose a threat to democracy.

populists tend to rule for more years than non-populists: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/ https://institute.global/policy/populist-harm-democracy-empirical-assessment

13% of countries today have compulsory voting at any level (eg, Australia nationwide, Switzerland with one canton): on average, their turnout is 7.3% higher than those without compulsory voting: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout/compulsory-voting

after adopting compulsory voting, Australian voter turnout increased by 24%; Labor vote share increased by 9%: https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-12055 https://sci-hub.se/10.1561/100.00012055

Engelen 2007: when compulsory voting has been abolished, turnout has fallen by 7-22%: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://sci-hub.se/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/858783920190390312/engelen2007.pdf

In the Netherlands (1971) turnout dropped from 92.1% in 1967 to 77.8% in 1971 (and to a historic low of 70.1% in 1998). In Switzerland (1974), where compulsory voting was only partially abolished, it fell from 53.2% in 1967 to 43.6% in 1975 (and to a historic low of 34.9% in 1999). In the only canton where voting remained compulsory, turnout is up to 20% higher than in the others (IDEA, 2004, 26 29). In the Philippines (from 1972 until 1987) turnout rose from 53.5% in 1967 to 78.6% in 1978 and fell from 78.2 per cent in 1987 to 65.3 in 1992 (and 64.8% in 2001). In Venezuela (from 1958 until 1993) turnout rose from 52.1% in 1947 to 79.7% in 1958 and fell from 72.7% in 1988 to 50.0% in 1993 (and 46.5% in 2000).

While every Austrian citizen had to attend presidential elections until 1980, this was only the case for four provinces in 1986. As everything else remained the same, the evolution in turnout levels can be attributed exclusively to compulsory voting. Before 1986, turnout nowhere deviated much from the average of 95.2% of registered citizens. It rose from 91.6% in 1980 to almost 95% in 1986 in regions retaining compulsory voting and dropped to 85% in regions abolishing it.

Engelen 2007: survey results from Belgium and Australia suggest that abolishing compulsory voting would reduce turnout by about 30%: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://sci-hub.se/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/858783920190390312/engelen2007.pdf

Another way of doing within-country comparisons is by means of surveys in which citizens that have to attend elections are asked whether they would vote if they no longer had to. Although this method tends to overestimate turnout in voluntary voting (would-be abstainers are more likely not to respond at all), results show that abolishing compulsory voting would probably lead to a decline of about 30% in countries like Australia (Jackman, 2001, 16316) and Belgium (Hooghe and Pelleriaux, 1998, 420 421).

even when not enforced, compulsory voting increases turnout: turnout in countries with non-enforced compulsory voting is still about 6% higher than countries voluntary voting: https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/voter-turnout-1945-global-report https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/voter-turnout-since-1945.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/739264712692334652/pintor2002.pdf

the vast majority of nonvoters in Australia don't even pay a fine: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026137949800047X https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/S0261-3794(98)00047-X

In practice, the proportion of voters required to pay penalties or taken to court never exceeds 1 per cent of the electorate and is normally much less. For example, following the 1993 federal election, the AEC investigated 490 230 cases of persons who appeared not to have voted, there being a total of 11 384 638 enrolled voters at that election. Of the 490 230, fines of $A20 each were paid by 23 230 electors who had voted (or 4.7 per cent of all nonvoters). The remainder gave valid reasons for not voting, save for 4412 who went to court (or 0.9 per cent of all non-voters). The AEC has no information on what happened thereafter to them.

Australia and Belgium (both of which have compulsory voting) have some of the lowest income bias (difference between high-income and low-income voter turnout) in the OECD: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.577.2450 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/739234485144518736/finseraas2007.pdf

higher turnout correlates with lower income bias (difference between high-income and low-income voter turnout): http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.577.2450 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/739234485144518736/finseraas2007.pdf

in Bendigo in 1899, property owners were 10% more likely to turn out than non-owners; in Victoria in 1877, property-owners comprised 84% percent of voters despite comprising just 59% of eligible voters (unfortunately, no data exists for comparison immediately after implementation of compulsory voting): https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-12055 https://sci-hub.se/10.1561/100.00012055

Put another way, property-owners comprised 84 percent of the electorate even though they only comprised 59 percent of the eligible voters.

Consistent with expectation, owners were 10 percentage points more likely to vote than occupiers. Also, property values are highly correlated with turnout for both owners and occupiers. A single standard deviation increase in property value is associated witha7percentage point increase in an individual s probability of voting for owners and a 10 percentage point increase in an individual s probability of voting for occupiers.4

Engelen 2007: higher participation genuinely means more democracy: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://sci-hub.se/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/858783920190390312/engelen2007.pdf

Indeed, where few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is (Verba and Nie, 1972, 1).

This forms a problem because governments normally respond to the opinions expressed by citizens in elections: if you don t vote, you don t count (Burnham, 1987, 99). This assumption has been empirically confirmed. In their cross-country comparison, Mueller and Stratmann (2003, 2151) found that political participation has a positive impact on income equality. The more citizens abstain, the greater income inequality will become.

moderates are the least likely to vote in general elections and in primary elections: https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-5-political-engagement-and-activism/

in the USA, nonvoters are disproportionately moderate Democrats: https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691159355/who-votes-now http://web.archive.org/web/20100921001908/http://www.nyu.edu:80/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/nagler/leighley_nagler_midwest2007.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/739244174599258155/leighley2007.pdf

higher turnout correlates with higher economic redistribution: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.577.2450 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/739234485144518736/finseraas2007.pdf

Engelen 2007: compulsory voting is a very small imposition; if you would not allow the state to force citizens to cast a ballot (taking perhaps 15 minutes), one must also not allow the state to force citizens to pay taxes (literally taking a proportion of their work-hours): https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://sci-hub.se/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/858783920190390312/engelen2007.pdf

However, opponents of compulsory voting are not so easily fobbed off and claim that no government may oblige its citizens to attend elections. This argument functions as some kind of rock-bottom: I oppose compulsory voting because it infringes on my freedom by which I may well prefer to stay at home. One can doubt whether the resistance of opponents who prefer to stay at home is really based on libertarian conscientious objections. Against those who abstain because of pragmatic considerations, one can argue that attending the polling station every two or three years is not too much to ask, especially compared to governmental obligations such as compulsory education and tax duties, which are much more time-consuming (Keaney and Rogers, 2006, 7, 30, 35). Given the importance of democracy, I believe a government has every right and reason to demand this much from its citizens

Bowman 2020: averaging across 22 definitions of policy disagreement, high-income (90%ile) support (opposition) increases (decreases) likelihood of policy adoption but middle-income (50%ile) opinions do not affect likelihood; see that affluent prefer clusters around ~+15% while middle prefer clusters near ~0%: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ssqu.12791 https://sci-hub.se/10.1111/ssqu.12791 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/947877299615846430/bowman2020.pdf

Gilens and Page 2014: the opinions of middle-income people (50%ile) did not predict policy change when controlling for the opinions of high-income people (90%ile) and corporate interest groups: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/testing-theories-of-american-politics-elites-interest-groups-and-average-citizens/62327F513959D0A304D4893B382B992B https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S1537592714001595 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/947930483877101568/gilens2014.pdf

Gilens and Page 2014: this suggests that the US is closer to the models of Biased Pluralism (economic elites have more power, average citizens have some power, poor have little power) or Economic Elite Domination (economic elites have all power): https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/testing-theories-of-american-politics-elites-interest-groups-and-average-citizens/62327F513959D0A304D4893B382B992B https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S1537592714001595 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/947930483877101568/gilens2014.pdf

Schakel 2019: todo xxx reread: https://academic.oup.com/ser/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ser/mwz018/5475880 https://sci-hub.se/10.1093/ser/mwz018

Persson 2021: todo xxx reread: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379421001256

Hertel-Fernandez et al 2018: todo xxx: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/legislative-staff-and-representation-in-congress/D7735FCF39B843B9F3269FD39362FD66

Woll 2016: todo xxx reread: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0032329216655318 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/0032329216655318 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/947946504553902182/woll2016.pdf

Schakel 2020: todo xxx: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0032329219897984 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/0032329219897984 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/947947067597266975/schakel2020.pdf

Bonica 2013: todo xxx reread: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.27.3.103

Grossman and Isaac 2016 preprint: economic policy, middle class (50th income percentile) public opinion + party support are the only significant predictors of policy adoption: http://matthewg.org/Gilens-Parties4.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/949101183778299935/grossman2016.pdf

Hersh 2021: todo xxx reread: https://www.eitanhersh.com/uploads/7/9/7/5/7975685/hersh_business_leaders_03082021.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/947943742692790293/hersh_business_leaders_fall2021.pdf https://www.eitanhersh.com/uploads/7/9/7/5/7975685/hersh_business_leaders_fall2021.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/947943749567250492/hersh_business_leaders_03082021.pdf

Gilens 2016: Bashir's simulation subsets the simulation dataset in such a way that it would be impossible to test Gilens and Page 2014's predictions; when the full dataset is used, it supports Gilens and Page 2014's results as being extremely unlikely to result from chance: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168016654720 http://sci-hub.se/10.1177/2053168016654720 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/947883854721581116/gilens2016.pdf

Republican megadonors are more economic-right and globalization-left than Republican voters; Democratic megadonors are more economic-left, social-left, and globalization-left than Democratic voters: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/what-elite-donors-want https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/84/1/104/5822054 https://sci-hub.se/10.1093/poq/nfaa001 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/971423163126796288/broockman2020.pdf

Republican megadonors (especially the Koch network) now exert more financial power than the Republican financial apparatus proper: https://www.vox.com/2016/4/14/11348780/gop-megadonors-koch-brothers https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/abs/koch-network-and-republican-party-extremism/035F3D872B0CE930AF02D7706DF46EEE https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S1537592716001122 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/971423163126796288/broockman2020.pdf

Raja and Schaffner 2015: donors as a whole are generally more partisan than general voters: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/12/23/21035165/donors-political-views-wine-cave https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/952489516 https://u1lib.org/book/5489646/89d6d1

McElwee Schaffner Rhodes 2016: larger political donations correlate with more right-wing beliefs on economic politics: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/12/9/13875096/us-political-donors https://www.demos.org/research/whose-voice-whose-choice-distorting-influence-political-donor-class-our-big-money https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/971929948036153374/mcelwee.pdf

McElwee Schaffner Rhodes 2016: Democratic donors who gave above $1000 are to the left of Democratic voters on economic politics: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/12/26/14042118/donors-democrats-bernie-sanders https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/12/9/13875096/us-political-donors https://www.demos.org/research/whose-voice-whose-choice-distorting-influence-political-donor-class-our-big-money https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/971929948036153374/mcelwee.pdf

Lax et al 2019: Democrats in the Senate voted in line with the opinions of the poor ~60% of the time and Republicans ~20% of the time : https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/party-or-the-purse-unequal-representation-in-the-us-senate/286BFEAA039374759DE14D782A0BB8DD https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S0003055419000315 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/949101681466044477/lax2019.pdf

Lax et al 2019: Democrats tend to align with the poor more than the rich; with rich partisans more than poor partisans: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/party-or-the-purse-unequal-representation-in-the-us-senate/286BFEAA039374759DE14D782A0BB8DD https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S0003055419000315 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/949101681466044477/lax2019.pdf

Rhodes and Schaffner 2017: the DW-NOMINATE ideology score of Democratic Representatives correlate more strongly with the ideology of poor voters in their district than rich voters; the opposite is true for Republicans, who correlate more strongly with the rich: https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-16077 https://sci-hub.se/10.1561/100.00016077 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/949101682099376158/rhodes2017.pdf

Rhodes and Schaffner 2017: CCES 2012 data shows that Democratic Representatives were equally likely to vote for bills their constituents support regardless of income, while Republicans were more likely to vote for bills their high-income constituents support: https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-16077 https://sci-hub.se/10.1561/100.00016077 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/949101682099376158/rhodes2017.pdf

Individuals with Democratic representatives encounter a mode of representation best described as populist, in which the relationship between income and representation is flat (if not negative). However, individuals with Republican representatives experience an oligarchic mode of representation, in which wealthy individuals receive much more representation than those lower on the economic ladder.

Grossman and Isaac 2016 preprint: Democrats in Congress represent the middle class more than the rich while Republicans do the reverse: http://matthewg.org/Gilens-Parties4.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/949101183778299935/grossman2016.pdf

Bartels 2015 preprint: todo xxx: http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Bartels2015.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/947941682018648104/Bartels2015.pdf

Bartels 2017 preprint: todo xxx: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/includes/Working_Paper_5_2017.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/947941690143031357/Bartels2017.pdf

Grossman et al 2022 preprint: todo xxx: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/719415 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/947946361070968882/Grossman2022.pdf

Martin and Yurukoglu 2017: people tend to watch news media that affirms their own views: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/8/16263710/fox-news-presidential-vote-study https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257%2Faer.20160812 http://sci-hub.se/10.1257/aer.20160812 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/786317526560276520/martin2017.pdf

http://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/biasmeas.pdf

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chikezie-Uzuegbunam/publication/304140282_Sensationalism_in_the_media_the_right_to_sell_or_the_right_to_tell/links/5838467908ae3a74b49cd484/Sensationalism-in-the-media-the-right-to-sell-or-the-right-to-tell.pdf

https://archive.org/details/marketdrivenjour0000mcma/page/n5/mode/2up

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/mediated-politics/reporting-and-the-push-for-marketoriented-journalism-media-organizations-as-businesses/542622970C3BE19D03CD91160EDDF7BC

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-18236-0_24

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14648849211036285?casa_token=4xsH4cPAICIAAAAA%3AE0LgmYYPqvGXhFYhdWmmLfCCWBCxjY9lBMXJgkaZ1z_GZUeCqV7qnWcMD01lfWf7g9m43wFnbfMP

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1748048512459143?casa_token=sjC3yJsrYgMAAAAA%3A7P8rPzi9b_FoyfsaFmDDxw0Z5HtgO7aOA3QXrKdt3qb-_jAuLArlEFRM4A1gBY3EQ0RgxOYkgxmu

https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/1748048512459143

If congresspeople have higher-than-reasonable stock investment returns, it may suggest that they are using their position for financial benefit. However, the research on this question is mixed.

Ziobrowski 2004: US senators see returns of 8%/yr higher than the overall market: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/article/abs/abnormal-returns-from-the-common-stock-investments-of-the-us-senate/A39406479940758D59E09FDCB8EE9BEC https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S0022109000003161 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/890372793101877338/ziobrowski2004.pdf

Ziobrowski 2011: US representatives see returns of 6%/yr higher than the overall market: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/business-and-politics/article/abs/abnormal-returns-from-the-common-stock-investments-of-members-of-the-us-house-of-representatives/BC6C6A524BBE96738BB94D37EF0FD1A5 https://sci-hub.se/10.2202/1469-3569.1308 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/890372807584784424/ziobrowski2011.pdf

Eggers 2013: the trading portfolios of US legislators were insignificantly better or worse than the market for most models of portfolio performance over 2004-2008: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1017/S0022381613000194 https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S0022381613000194 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/890373583862390824/eggers2013.pdf

Klumpp 2016: states which were affected by the Citizens United ruling were 4-5pp more likely to elect Republican candidates than before CU: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/yes-citizens-united-gives-republicans-an-electoral-edge-heres-proof/2016/04/07/c9fe3fa4-fb5c-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html https://journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/685691 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/925862197731684473/klumpp2016.pdf todo reread for causal effect

Bonica 2017: instrumental variable: early fundraising strongly correlates with winning primary races: https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2016.0413 https://sci-hub.se/10.1089/elj.2016.0413 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/982154650969063424/bonica2017.pdf instrument: professional degree of the candidate (reasonably uncorrelated with vote share)

Shepherd 2013: justices received higher campaign funds and proportionately more funds from businesses in retention elections (3%), nonpartisan elections (17%), and partisan elections (25%): https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/old-uploads/originals/documents/JusticeAtRisk_Nov2013.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/727630557478912090/justice_at_risk.pdf

Shepherd 2013: relative to appointed judges, a higher proportion of business contributions correlated with a higher likelihood with siding with a business; however, this correlation was only significant in nonpartisan elections (not retention elections or partisan elections): https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/old-uploads/originals/documents/JusticeAtRisk_Nov2013.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/727630557478912090/justice_at_risk.pdf

Shepherd 2009: in partisan elections, campaign contributions from pro-business groups correlate with voting for businesses, labor groups with voting against employers, insurance companies with businesses and defendants in liability and tort cases; some, but not all, of these correlations are present in nonpartisan elections: (note: this study is weaker b/c it tests each type of contribution separately) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1910787 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/728329768772304956/shepherd2009a.pdf n1=>28,000 cases, n2=470 judges; Control variables: judge ideology score, tenure, industrial sector of litigant, type of issue under litigation, proportion of years since 1960 that Republicans have controlled state legislature, whether a lower apellate court exists, whether all supreme court justices vote on all cases (en banc), whether court has discretionary review

O'Dell 2019: over the previous eight years, 10163 "model" bills were introduced across US states, disproportionately from industry think-tanks (42.3%) and conservative bill factories (39.5%), and about 40% of them are passed into law: https://mobile.twitter.com/robodellaz/status/1113868879338434560 https://www.usatoday.com/pages/interactives/asbestos-sharia-law-model-bills-lobbyists-special-interests-influence-state-laws/ https://www.azcentral.com/pages/interactives/asbestos-sharia-law-model-bills-lobbyists-special-interests-influence-state-laws/ https://archive.ph/lpWqt

But decades of research suggest that money probably isn t the deciding factor in who wins a general election, and especially not for incumbents. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2605401

Most of the research on this was done in the last century, Bonica told me, and it generally found that spending didn t affect wins for incumbents and that the impact for challengers was unclear. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002764203260415

Most of the research on this was done in the last century, Bonica told me, and it generally found that spending didn t affect wins for incumbents and that the impact for challengers was unclear. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2138764

Most of the research on this was done in the last century, Bonica told me, and it generally found that spending didn t affect wins for incumbents and that the impact for challengers was unclear http://www.sas.rochester.edu/psc/clarke/214/Gerber98.pdf

And, beginning around the mid-2000s, they began making serious progress on understanding how ads actually affect whether people vote and who they vote for. The picture that s emerged is well let s just say it s probably rather disappointing to the campaigns that spend a great deal of time and effort raising all that money to begin with. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/money-and-elections-a-complicated-love-story/ https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104820

And, beginning around the mid-2000s, they began making serious progress on understanding how ads actually affect whether people vote and who they vote for. The picture that s emerged is well let s just say it s probably rather disappointing to the campaigns that spend a great deal of time and effort raising all that money to begin with. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/money-and-elections-a-complicated-love-story/ http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/lau/articles/Lau-Rovner_NegativeCampaigning.pdf

And, beginning around the mid-2000s, they began making serious progress on understanding how ads actually affect whether people vote and who they vote for. The picture that s emerged is well let s just say it s probably rather disappointing to the campaigns that spend a great deal of time and effort raising all that money to begin with. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/money-and-elections-a-complicated-love-story/ https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/minimal-persuasive-effects-of-campaign-contact-in-general-elections-evidence-from-49-field-experiments/753665A313C4AB433DBF7110299B7433

Take, for example, the study that is probably the nation s only truly real-world political advertising field experiment. During Rick Perry s 2006 re-election campaign for Texas governor, a team of researchers convinced Perry s campaign to run ads in randomly assigned markets and then tracked the effect of those ads over time using surveys. Advertising did produce a pro-Perry response in the markets that received the treatment. But that bump fizzled fast. Within a week after ads stopped running, it was like no one had ever seen them. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41480831 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/DA29FE8A5581C772006A1DEBB21CFC4C https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S000305541000047X

Ongoing research from Alexander Fouirnaies, professor of public policy at the University of Chicago, suggests that, as it becomes normal for campaigns to spend higher and higher amounts, fewer people run and more of those who do are independently wealthy. In other words, the arms race of unnecessary campaign spending could help to enshrine power among the well-known and privileged. https://www.dropbox.com/s/t96hcfls5a1g3ss/SpendingLimits.pdf

types of selection systems by state: https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/26/2/290/830985 https://sci-hub.se/10.1093/jleo/ewn023

relative to appointed judges, elected judges are more productive (write more opinions per year: +61.6% for partisan, +29.1% nonpartisan), have similar quality (non-significantly-different citation rates by out-of-state judges), have substantially more dissents (+92.7% for partisan, +76.9% for nonpartisan), and have similar independence (measured by likelihood of disagreeing with same-party judges on the same case): https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/26/2/290/830985 https://sci-hub.se/10.1093/jleo/ewn023 n1=27596 opinions, n2=408 state supreme court justices

Productivity is measured by total number of opinions written for any given year, including dissents and concurrences (Total Opinions).

Our primary quality variable is the number of out-ofstate citations to a particular opinion by a particular judge (Outside State Citations).

Our independence measure focuses on the tendency of judges to write opinions that disagree with co-partisans when the pool of judges provides opportunities to do so. We define an opposing opinion as either a majority opinion when a dissent exists or a dissent when a majority exists. We assume that a judge exhibits independence when she writes an opposing opinion against a co-partisan.

^ control variables: https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/26/2/290/830985 https://sci-hub.se/10.1093/jleo/ewn023 whether justice is chief justice, experience in court, experience after law school, years before retirement, age, sex, whether they had served in private practice, justice ideology score, justice salary, whether any new justices joined the court, number of justices, whether retirement is mandatory, clerks per judge, number of trial cases, whether the decision went through an intermediate appellate court, whether publication is mandatory, state age, state population size, crime, median age of state population, median income of state population, proportion black people in population, and ideology of state citizens

the rate of "incorrect" decisions (those that disagrees with the rest of the court) is substantially higher for elected judges (.3%) than appointed judges (.1%): https://www.princeton.edu/news/2013/02/22/researchers-find-appointed-justices-outperform-elected-counterparts https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272712000941 https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.007 1 = probability voting correctly, 0 = incorrectly

[J]udges that are shielded from voters' influence on average also have a lower probability of reaching an incorrect decision (0.1%) than justices that face retention elections (0.5%), and elected justices (0.3%). The effect is larger when we consider the probability of incorrectly overturning the decision of the lower courts. While judges that are shielded from voters' influence incorrectly overturn the lower court very infrequently (0.03%), the corresponding probabilities are 0.7% for justices facing retention elections and 0.6% for justices facing competitive reelections.

justifications for above methodology: https://www.princeton.edu/news/2013/02/22/researchers-find-appointed-justices-outperform-elected-counterparts https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272712000941 https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.007 n1=5958 cases, n2=520 state Supreme Court justices: Control variables: `appeal or original or habeas corpus` `whether Petitioner is original defendant or the State` `evidence, sentencing and jury instruction` `years of prior judicial experience` `whether each justice had prior political experience or not` `number of years serving in the state Supreme Court` `whether the justice was elected or appointed` `whether she was appointed for life by elected officials, appointed for one term by elected officials with a possible reappointment by the same elected officials, or appointed for one term by elected officials with a possible reappointment depending on an up-or-down decision by voters in a retention election` `party-adjusted judicial ideology` `citizen (CIT) and government (GOV) ideology for the relevant state`Argument for why non-unanimous decisions are incorrect:

Now, as it is, this identification scheme appears to penalize maverick justices who go against the grain by assigning them a low precision parameter. However, in the empirical work, we control for many case-specific covariates, and take into account inherent differences among justices due to political ideology, judicial experience, etc. Therefore, justices with low 's are those who have attributes that characterize justices who vote inconsistently, even after taking characteristics of the case into account: these are not maverick justices, but erratic ones.

Republican judges elected in partisan elections are substantially more likely to vote for businesses over individuals, employers over workers, doctors/hospitals over malpractice claimants, and defendants in tort cases -- however, these relations all disappear (except tort) if the judge is in their final term before mandatory retirement, suggesting re-election is the motivating factor: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1910787 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/728329768772304956/shepherd2009a.pdf n1=>28,000 cases, n2=470 judges; Control variables: judge ideology score, tenure, industrial sector of litigant, type of issue under litigation, proportion of years since 1960 that Republicans have controlled state legislature, whether a lower apellate court exists, whether all supreme court justices vote on all cases (en banc), whether court has discretionary review

justices selected by the legislature or governor and justices elected in partisan races are more likely to vote in favor of the state, and this likelihood increases as they approach the end of their term (regression coefficient = percentage point difference in cases decided): https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1910897 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/728329767782318110/shepherd2009b.pdf

The magnitudes of the marginal effects are statistically significant, but not huge. For example, the results suggest that a judge facing a gubernatorial reappointment, compared to the base category of judges facing unopposed retention elections, is approximately 7 percentage points more likely to vote in favor of the executive branch litigant.

both elective and appointive systems are producing similarly poor outcomes in terms of the diversity of judges: https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/improving-judicial-diversity https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Improving-Judicial-Diversity.pdf

Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Diversity in State and Federal Appellate Courts: Change and Continuity Across 20 Years, 29 Just. Sys. J. 47, 52-53 (2008); see also id. at 52 (showing in 2005 nationally 12.97% of merit selected state appellate judges and 11.48% of elected state appellate judges are minorities and 23.35% of merit selected state appellate judges and 28.12% of elected state appellate judges are women); id at 66 (stating black women do fare somewhat better in electoral systems but Hispanic men seemed disadvantaged by elections); see also Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, An Examination of Judicial Diversity in the State Courts Over Time, 85 Judicature 84, 88.(2001) (finding by 1999 there was no tangible difference in the ability of NWMs [nonwhite males] to attain a position in the judiciary via either merit or non-merits systems. ).

judicial elections emerged as an anti-corruption reform: https://today.law.harvard.edu/book-review/in-new-book-shugerman-explores-the-history-of-judicial-selection-in-the-u-s/ [unformatted]

Shugerman discovered that at first the plan to create a more independent judiciary through popular elections worked. The first generation of elected judges in the early 19th century exercised the power of judicial review far more often than their predecessors did. Perhaps ironically, these democratically elected judges were also the first to criticize democratic excesses and to argue from a countermajoritarian perspective.

I began the book feeling horrified by American judicial elections, Shugerman says. When his research revealed that a significant impetus behind them was to correct for the corruption and partisanship of judicial appointments, he saw that judicial elections had a good-faith logic in their 19th-century context. From the republic s earliest days, Shugerman notes, the challenge of judicial selection has been to balance judicial accountability, which demands that judges bend to popular and political pressures, and judicial independence, which demands judicial allegiance to the rule of law. As he mined the historical record, he found that judicial election advocates vied for popular support for their cause by framing it primarily in terms of judicial independence.

Of all the methods he looks at, Shugerman claims that merit selection, which involves vetting by a panel of professionals and executive appointment to a first term, followed by retention elections, has yielded the most judicial independence. It is currently employed in about 20 states. But he warns that it, too, may be adversely affected by the excessive campaign spending that preceded and may now be accelerated indirectly by Citizens United.

total federal, state, and local spending on legal aid was just $1.385 billion in 2013: https://www.law.com/almID/1202730102717/The-Justice-Gap-How-Big-Law-Is-Failing-Legal-Aid/?/&slreturn=20191002113100 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/640215461199347732/BTB_23_PRECON_Poverty_Simulation_2.pdf

JPMorgan Chase alone spends $3-12 billion per year on legal cases: https://qz.com/809963/weirdly-jpmorgan-chase-jpm-is-now-making-money-from-litigation/

the USA spends far less per capita on legal aid than other countries: https://mobile.twitter.com/PeteDDavis/status/1118884965771632640 https://books.google.com/books?id=mtGltAEACAAJ

the USA spends far less per capita on legal aid than other countries: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46711885_International_Journal_for_Court_administration_2008_no_1

per capita spending: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/LegalAid/Global-Study-on-Legal-Aid_Report01.pdf https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/LegalAid/GSLA_-_Country_Profiles.pdf

per capita spending: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228591899_Report_on_costs_of_legal_aid_in_other_countries

per capita spending: http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2010/justice/15610.pdf

mandatory arbitration reduces employee winrate by 15% in absolute terms and (41.2% in relative terms) and reduces employee damages received by 140000 (79.3%): https://www.epi.org/publication/mandatory-arbitration-unfairly-tilts-the-legal-system/ https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/

56.2% of private-sector nonunion employees are subject to mandatory employment arbitration -- preventing them from using public courts: https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-workers/

the text of the US constitution, Article 3, does not set the number of Supreme Court justices: https://constitutioncenter.org/media/files/constitution.pdf

the number of Supreme Court justices has varied substantially over time; prior to 1869, a supreme court justice was added for each federal circuit added (we currently have 13 -- 11 + DC + FED): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Justices_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States_by_seat

1789: 6 justices: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judiciary_Act_of_1789

1807: 7 justices: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventh_Circuit_Act_of_1807

1837: 9 justices: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eighth_and_Ninth_Circuits_Act_of_1837

1863: 10 justices: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenth_Circuit_Act_of_1863

1866: 7 justices: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_Circuits_Act

1869: 9 justices: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judiciary_Act_of_1869

since 1993, the partisanship of every Supreme Court nominee has steadily increased: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-the-supreme-courts-reputation-is-at-stake/

1987: Democrats win Bork partisan vote: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Bork_Supreme_Court_nomination

2005: Republicans threaten to end filibuster, de-escalate in deal to withdraw some nominees: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_option#2005_debate_on_judicial_nominations

2013: Democrats win 52-48 vote to eliminate filibuster for non-Supreme-Court judicial nominees: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_option#2013:_Nominations_except_Supreme_Court

2016: Republicans fail to consider Garland nomination: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merrick_Garland_Supreme_Court_nomination

2017: Republicans win 52-48 vote to eliminate filibuster for Supreme Court judicial nominees: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_option#2017:_Supreme_Court_nominations

2019: Republicans win 52-48 vote to appoint Barrett nomination: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amy_Coney_Barrett_Supreme_Court_nomination

when the Court is unpopular, it strikes down fewer laws: a hostile Congress strongly correlates with a decrease in laws struck down by the Supreme Court: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00411.x https://sci-hub.se/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00411.x https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/772593813554331648/clark2009.pdf

public opinion strongly predicts court decisions at the case level (better than previous studies, which aggregate over each year): https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2087255 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/772598275084779550/epsteinMartin2012.pdf

the Supreme Court's decisions on politically salient issues (defined as "appearing on the front page of the NYT") are not significantly predicted by popular opinion -- however, this may be endogenous due to the definition of "salient" (nonsalient issues ARE predicted by popular opinion; it's possible the NYT does not report on cases that align with public opinion): https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00485.x http://sci-hub.se/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00485.x https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/772596053407957012/casillas2010.pdf

the Supreme Court is more popular when it aligns with public opinion: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00485.x http://sci-hub.se/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00485.x https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/772596053407957012/casillas2010.pdf

the addition of ACB would make the Supreme Court the most conservative it's ever been -- and with the largest gap between House (-.3), Senate (-.3), Presidential (-.9), and Supreme Court (+.8) ideology scores ever: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/22/if-trump-appoints-third-justice-supreme-court-would-be-most-conservative-its-been-since-1950/ https://archive.is/QxSO5

While very liberal during the Warren Court from 1953 to 1969, the court median has hovered on the center right since the mid-1970s, except for a brief liberal interlude after Justice Antonin Scalia s death in February 2016 until Neil M. Gorsuch filled that seat in early 2017.

[N]ot only would the court median become substantially more conservative than it is today, it would become the most conservative court across the entire measured period. The court could also be more conservative than the elected branches to a degree not seen in 70 years. Given the high probability that Democrats will retain control of the House, the expected court median is likely to be vastly more conservative than the House median.

despite previous escalations, the SCOTUS has remained near "0" (neither liberal or conservative leaning) since 1935; this is because judges have usually replaced ideologically similar judges; the appointment of ACB will shift the court dramatically rightward even if she is a moderate: https://sci-hub.se/10.1093/pan/10.2.134 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/772578456792989717/martin2002.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideological_leanings_of_United_States_Supreme_Court_justices

How does this measure compare to existing measures of judicial preferences? We first correlate our measure with the percentage conservative voting on civil rights, civil liberties, economics, and federalism cases across a justice s career [these measures, as well as the percent liberalism scores below, are taken from Epstein et al. (2001)]. This is in the spirit of the methodological audit of Epstein and Mershon (1996). The results are quite interesting: the posterior means correlate with these issue areas at 0.86, 0.83, 0.70, and 0.60, respectively (J = 29). These clearly outperform the scores of Segal and Cover (1989), which correlate at 0.63, 0.60, 0.43, and 0.33 (J = 29). This justifies the unidimensionality assumption because one dimension explains a good deal of variance across many issue areas. The measure also correlates highly with Schubert s (1974) C-scale (0.77) and E-scale (0.56) (J = 17) and Rohde and Spaeth s (1976) freedom ( 0.79), equality ( 0.75), and New Deal ( 0.85) scales (J = 18).

since 1960, the average justice joined the court at ~45 and left at ~75 years old: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-supreme-court-justice-tenure/ https://archive.is/UQSKX

^ we haven't been appointing them younger, they've just been living longer: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-supreme-court-justice-tenure/ https://archive.is/UQSKX

since ~1950, the average Supreme Court justice's tenure rose from ~15 years to ~25 years: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_Supreme_Court_justices_by_time_in_office

organization in favor of this effect: https://fixthecourt.com/fix/term-limits/

ro khanna's bill: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/8424

ro khanna on 5-4 podcast: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy5tZWdhcGhvbmUuZm0vV1dPNTU5MTczNjcwNQ/episode/MjlmMmJmNWMtNWNkNC0xMWVhLTlmZDYtMGJjNTE0NGIwZjY0

another article on the same subject: https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2020/08/03/488518/need-supreme-court-term-limits/

^ critique of term limits -- to me, this just suggests that longer term limits (eg 30 years) + fixed appointment rates (eg, 1 per 2 years) are better: https://hbr.org/2018/07/the-supreme-court-has-a-longevity-problem-but-term-limits-on-justices-wont-solve-it

inspiration: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3210665 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/772622103231987762/Seligman2018.pdf

inspiration: https://cullenokeefe.com/blog/scotus

In the first step, Democrats will pass a bill that adds four new Supreme Court seats. Crucially, however, the bill would contain two limitations: 1: The new seats would not be open until (say) September 1, 2022 (while the Democrats still control the White House and Senate). 2: The new seats would never be open (i.e., the bill would have no effect) if a stabilizing constitutional Amendment was passed by that date.

Republicans would be faced with two options: 1: Escalatory option: Cede their hard-won SCOTUS majority to the Democrats in two years by allowing President Biden to appoint four new Justices. 2: Stabilizing option: Work with the Democrats to pass the Amendment and temporarily preserve their 2/3 SCOTUS majority.

the GOP has already played hardball and ignored the rules: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/09/kavanaugh-us-supreme-court-fight-back-court-packing

[I]f the Democrats pack the courts, Republicans will retaliate by packing the courts even more when next they are in power. [....] That is, if the left expands the court s membership to 15, then the Republicans will expand it to 17, or 19, when they are in power next. And that makes sense until you remember: didn t the Republicans already adjust the size of the court (shrinking it to eight, by refusing to consider Judge Merrick Garland s nomination) when they had the power to do it?

if the GOP did retaliate, the left and Democrats would be in just as bad a position as they currently are: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/09/kavanaugh-us-supreme-court-fight-back-court-packing

And if, in a decade, the right did further expand the court and take back control of it how would that leave the left in any position that s worse than now? This objection ( what if they retaliate?! ) feels, in present circumstances, a bit like worrying that if the Allies invade Normandy, the Nazis will shoot at them. It s not wrong, exactly, but it seems bereft of some of the essential context.

the GOP happily held up lower court appointments: Obama was the only modern president to leave office with more vacancies than he entered with -- Trump has enormously lowered vacancies: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/01/28/judicial-appointments-in-trumps-first-three-years-myths-and-realities/

^ vacancies were enormously larger than appointments for every year of Obama's term: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/09/06/recess-is-over-time-to-confirm-judges/

Trump appointed 28% of circuit of appeals judgeships, compared to Obama's 14%; Trump appointed 21% of all judgeships (district + appeals), compared to Obama's 14%: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/01/28/judicial-appointments-in-trumps-first-three-years-myths-and-realities/

Republican-appointed judges are now 54% of the appeals judges (up from 40% at Trump's inauguration): https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/01/28/judicial-appointments-in-trumps-first-three-years-myths-and-realities/

50000 trial graph of 179 50/50 split court decisions (+1 to one side):

50000 trial graph of .5 binomial distribution:

50000 trial graph of 0,3 normal distribution:

if the court can't find 5 justices to fill the "middle", the party who has control of Congress/President may simply choose not to rule on cases that year

this formalizes two party rule, which makes it harder to move towards a diverse party system.

it's hard.

support for impeachment rose sharply from 51% against 38% support (-13) to 43% against 49% support (+6) after the Democrats announced impeachment articles: https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/impeachment-polls/

support for court packing is currently 47% against 34% support (-13): https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/10/07/supreme-cort-packing-poll

support for term limits for the Supreme Court is very strong, at 77% support 23% against (+54%): https://fixthecourt.com/2019/06/new-poll-americans-still-prefer-supreme-court-term-limits-court-packing/

summary of the debate:

minimum demand: balanced courts; maximum demand: court reform --> game theory: structure demand in such a way that escalation (accepting minimum demand but rejecting maximum demand) is less desireable than reform (accepting maximum demand)

my proposal: the ranked choice term limited or RCTL supreme court

- 20 year term limit

^ prevents any president from appointing more than 8/20=40% of the court

^ prevents justices from exceeding historical term limit

- every 2 years, ranked choice selection of 5 justices (total court size: 50)

^ ensures ~2 lib, ~2 con, ~1 moderate

"This seems to be Bastiat's preferred solution. Maybe you guys can simply agree on that lol:" https://twitter.com/PinkWug/status/1322265152578871303

"Yeah, this is my position - thanks" https://twitter.com/EverydayBastiat/status/1322269461630619652

news article describing solutions: https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/12/academic-highlight-epps-and-sitaraman-on-how-to-save-the-supreme-court/ https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/9/6/17827786/kavanaugh-vote-supreme-court-packing

academic article describing solutions: "Under this framework, we evaluate existing proposals and offer two of our own: the Supreme Court Lottery and the Balanced Bench." https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3288958 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/772614999117791243/EppsSitaraman2019.pdf

federalist no. 78: https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#:~:text=has%20no%20influence,purse&text=and%20must%20ultimately,judgments The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.

Ginsberg opposed court-packing because she felt it would reduce judicial independence: https://www.npr.org/2019/07/24/744633713/justice-ginsburg-i-am-very-much-alive "

"If anything would make the court look partisan, it would be that one side saying, 'When we're in power, we're going to enlarge the number of judges, so we would have more people who would vote the way we want them to.' We are blessed in the way no other judiciary in the world is. We have life tenure. The only way to get rid of a federal judge is by impeachment. Congress can't retaliate by reducing our salary, so the safeguards for judicial independence in this country, I think, are as great or greater than anyplace else in the world.

Ginsberg's argument hinges on the idea that people follow the judiciary's rulings: https://www.npr.org/2019/07/24/744633713/justice-ginsburg-i-am-very-much-alive "

But the whole notion of the country's independent judiciary hinges on public trust, she noted. "The court has no troops at its command," Ginsburg pointed out, "doesn't have the power of the purse, and yet time and again, when the courts say something, people accept it." She recalled Bush v. Gore, the controversial case in which the Supreme Court stopped a Florida recount in the 2000 presidential election. "I dissented from that decision," Ginsburg said. "I thought it was unwise. A lot of people disagreed with it. And yet the day after the court rendered its decision, there were no riots in the streets. People adjusted to it. And life went on.

news outlets reported about 17% of corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) events studied; a news outlet is more likely to report CSI if the outlet is a daily publication (+3.6-3.9%), if it is left-leaning (+2.8% relative to right-leaning), and if the incident came from a large or well-known corporation; a news outlet is less likely to report CSI if it has an advertising relationship (-.9%) or if it has a selective advertising relationship (-7.8%): https://www.ama.org/2020/04/01/press-release-from-the-journal-of-marketing-media-bias-with-corporate-social-irresponsibility-events/ https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022242920911907 http://sci-hub.se/10.1177/0022242920911907

online media focused more on Hillary Clinton's scandals than her politics: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUrGA48clA4 http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/9780190923624.pdf

Ritchie 2019: compared to both actual frequency of deaths and frequency of Google Searches, the NYT and Guardian were more likely to cover certain types of death -- terrorism (~3400x actual, 5x Google), homicide (26x actual, 7x Google) -- and less likely to cover others -- road incidents & accidents (0.3x actual, 0.2x Google), cancer (.3x actual, .37x Google): https://ourworldindata.org/does-the-news-reflect-what-we-die-from

Dalal 2015: in a convenience sample of major events, the New York Times was substantially more likely to cover deaths from terrorism than deaths from disease, drowning, or natural disasters: https://www.nemil.com/s/part3-horror-films.html https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/nemil.dalal/viz/CoveragevsDeathsWorldexclNepalEarthquake/NYTimesCoveragevsNumberofWorldDeathsexclNepal

Dalal 2015: the New York Times is significantly more likely to cover terrorism than other kinds of death: https://www.nemil.com/s/part3-horror-films.html

Willnat and Weaver 2014: journalists are 4x more likely to be affiliated as Democratic (28.1%) than Republican (7.1%): https://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2014/05/survey-7-percent-of-reporters-identify-as-republican-188053 http://archive.news.indiana.edu/releases/iu/2014/05/2013-american-journalist-key-findings.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/965050523231330394/weaver2014.pdf

Power and Miller 2018: Sunday talk news shows actually tilt conservative: https://www.mediamatters.org/blog/2018/11/02/study-over-past-3-months-guest-panels-sunday-shows-have-been-overwhelmingly-conservative/221974 https://archive.ph/wip/4Tg41

CNN actually gives Republican guests more air time than Democratic guests: https://web.stanford.edu/~ayurukog/cable_news.pdf

Ledwich and Zaitsev 2020: the "partisan left" and the "partisan right" are equally more likely to be recommended to an anonymous user: https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v25i3.10419 https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/10419/9404

the BBC secretly colluded with MI5 to keep out leftist journalists: http://www.bbc.com/news/stories-43754737 https://archive.ph/PMoaG

CJR 2010: uniquely among governments of the time, the US government recognized that the market wouldn't underfund investigative media, so they subsidized media to the tune of $30 billion (0.2% of GDP): https://archives.cjr.org/the_news_frontier/rejuvenating_american_journali.php https://archive.ph/I0FMs

There was no notion that the market, unsubsidized, would produce sufficient journalism; the idea was unthinkable until the late 19th or early 20th century, when, with the striking explosion in advertising, commercial interests began to prosper. To that end, in the first generations of our nation s history the federal government instituted extraordinarily large postal and printing subsidies with the explicit goal of broadening and deepening the amount of newspapers and periodical in the United States. These were brilliant subsidies that did not favor a single party or viewpoint; indeed, they made much of the abolitionist press possible while also supporting pro-slavery publications. If the United States federal government devoted the same percentage of GDP to subsidizing journalism today that it did in the 1840s, for example, the expenditure would be around $30 billion. Indeed the one area that distinguished the American government from European governments at the time was its commitment to creating a huge and credible democratic press system.

CJR 2010: explaining the "Citizenship News Voucher" concept: $200/yr voucher to nonprofit media as defined broadly by the IRS: https://archives.cjr.org/the_news_frontier/rejuvenating_american_journali.php https://archive.ph/I0FMs

The idea is simple: every American adult gets a $200 voucher she can use to donate government money to any nonprofit news medium of her choice. She will indicate her choice on her tax return. If she does not file a tax return, a simple form will be available to use. She can split her $200 among several different qualifying nonprofit media. This program would be purely voluntary, like the tax-form check-offs for funding elections or protecting wildlife. A government agency, possibly operating out of the Internal Revenue Service, can be set up to allocate the funds and to determine eligibility according to universal standards that err on the side of expanding rather than constraining the number of qualifying media.

Baker 2003: explains the program artistic freedom voucher (AFV): https://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/20794 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/853444815344369664/baker2003.pdf

The AFV would allow each individual to contribute a refundable tax credit of approximately $100 to a creative worker of their choice, or to an intermediary who passes funds along to creative workers. Recipients of the AFV (creative workers and intermediaries) would be required to register with the government in the same way that religious or charitable organizations must now register for tax-exempt status. This registration is only for the purpose of preventing fraud it does not involve any evaluation of the quality of the work being produced.

Baker 2003: explains funding for the AFV and scope of its benefits: https://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/20794 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/853444815344369664/baker2003.pdf

In exchange for receiving AFV support, creative workers would be ineligible for copyright protection for a significant period of time (e.g. five years). Copyrights and the AFV are alternative ways in which the government supports creative workers. Creative workers are entitled to be compensated once for their work, not twice. The AFV would not affect a creative workers ability to receive money for concerts or other live performances. [....] A $100 per adult voucher would be sufficient to pay 500,000 writers, musicians, singers, actors, or other creative workers $40,000 a year. All of the material produced by these workers would be placed in the public domain where it could be freely reproduced.

^ status quo: 5 million cultural workers: https://nasaa-arts.org/nasaa_research/facts-figures-on-the-creative-economy/

There were 5.2 million arts and cultural sector jobs in America in 2017 accounting for 3.3% of all U.S. jobs which collectively paid workers a total of $446.7 billion. Explore your state s level of arts employment with NASAA s Creative Economy State Profiles.

Baker 2003: explains savings from waiving of copyright: https://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/20794 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/853444815344369664/baker2003.pdf

The AFV would create a vast amount of uncopyrighted material. [....] Under plausible assumptions, the savings from reduced expenditures on copyrighted material would vastly exceed the cost of the AFV. [....] The AFV would immediately create a pool of money (approximately $20 billion annually) to support creative and artistic workers that is far larger than the amount that currently flows to them through copyright-protected material. [...] [T]he current distribution of royalties and related payments is heavily concentrated among a small group of singers, actors, writers and other creative workers[.] [...] This means that almost all creative workers would stand to earn far more through the AFV system than through the copyright system. [....] The projections assume much more modest savings (20 percent in the high savings scenario and 10 percent in the low savings scenario) in the case of books, advertising, and cable and pay TV. In these cases, a much higher proportion of the costs are attributable to the physical production and distribution of the material, rather than the compensation of the creative workers.

even for conservatives, publicly funded media (NPR, PBS, BBC, public TV in general) has higher trust: https://www.rjionline.org/stories/who-trusts-and-pays-for-the-news-heres-what-8728-people-told-us

even for conservatives, publicly funded media (NPR, PBS) has higher trust: https://www.rjionline.org/reporthtml.html https://kf-site-production.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/pdfs/000/000/255/original/KnightFoundation_AccuracyandBias_Report_FINAL.pdf

Chandel 2016: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/aug/08/public-service-media-rightwing-extremism-ebu-psbs https://www.ebu.ch/news/2016/08/ebu-research-shows-strong-public-service-media-contributes-to-a-healthy-democracy https://web.archive.org/web/20160910131332/http://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-MIS%20-%20PSM%20Correlations%20-%20Public.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/968235641827643442/Chandel2016.pdf

https://www.ebu.ch/video-talks/membersonly/2021/09/no-democracy-without-media-a-research-perspective

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0267323121991334

https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/70218

https://www.ebu.ch/publications/research/login_only/report/trust-in-media

https://www.ebu.ch/news/2022/01/public-media-and-democracy-in-turbulent-times--lessons-from-lithuania

Pickard 2008: http://web.archive.org/web/20200811010828/https://www.asc.upenn.edu/news-events/publications/victor-pickard-josh-stearns-craig-aaron-saving-news-toward-national https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/853473046731030528/pickard2008.pdf

McChesney 2011: https://brill.com/view/journals/pgdt/10/1/article-p224_17.xml

https://techliberation.com/2010/04/14/the-wrong-way-to-reinvent-media-part-3-media-vouchers/#_ftn12

https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/how-will-journalism-survive-internet-age/mcchesney.pdf

https://twitter.com/DemocracyPolicy/status/1351246730776330241

https://www.jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/96/37

https://www.niemanlab.org/2011/03/funding-public-media-how-the-us-compares-to-the-rest-of-the-world/

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1rJrpsZJg_FZX7Fk396v8reyEF-0fRweGRBUKcJcoQ4I/edit

https://nofilmschool.com/2014/01/sundance-infographic-numbers-in-independent-film

https://www.documentarytelevision.com/documentary-budget/sundance-and-the-single-documentary-economy-the-1-3-billion-cost-of-missing-out/

right-wing users exist within a right-wing media echochamber where the furthest-right news is rewarded and center-right news is shunned: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUrGA48clA4 http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/9780190923624.pdf The particular prominence of the right-most column in Figure 2.7 reflects the overwhelming prominence of Breitbart, as also reflected in the network maps. [...] On Twitter, the center-right is the least represented. On Facebook, both the center and center-right garnered relatively little attention. This pattern suggests that social media sharing in general is more partisan than hyperlinking, and sharing on Facebook is more partisan than on Twitter.

right-wing users exist within a right-wing media echochamber where Breitbart and Fox dominate: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUrGA48clA4 http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/9780190923624.pdf While the prominence of individual media sources in the right-wing sphere varies when assessed by shares on Facebook and Twitter, the content and core structure, with Breitbart at the center, is stable across platforms. Even in the highly charged pre-election months, everyone outside the Breitbart-centered universe formed a tightly interconnected attention network, with major traditional mass-media and professional sources at the core. The right, by contrast, formed its own insular sphere centered on Breitbart. [....] Outside the rightwing ecosystem, we did not see a leftward polarization but its opposite an increase in the authority of, and attention paid to, the traditional professional media that occupy the center and center-left, at the expense of the left. On the right, the most important shift was that Fox News reasserted its authority as the central node of the online right-wing media ecosystem. This revival came at the expense of Breitbart, which declined to second place online (leaving aside Fox dominance of conservative television throughout the election and post-election periods). However, Fox News s resurgence did not increase connections between the right and the rest of the network. During the election, Fox online received 40 percent of its inlinks from the right quintile. In the year after the election, Fox received 51 percent of its links from the right quintile. This shift reflected a decline in linking to Fox across-the-board, not only from the left. Indeed, links from the center-right and the center to Fox declined proportionately more than did links from the center-left and left.8

in 2016, belief in 1 or more of 3 fake news stories (Pope Francis endorsed Trump, Clinton sold weapons to ISIS, Clinton had very serious illness) is correlated with vote switching from Obama to Trump: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4429952-Fake-News-May-Have-Contributed-to-Trump-s-2016.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/03/a-new-study-suggests-fake-news-might-have-won-donald-trump-the-2016-election/

^ how many people looked at these stories? pope francis: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ysnzawW6pDGBEqbXqeYuzWa7Rx2mQUip6CXUUUk4jIk/edit#gid=1756764129

^ example of fabricated news: http://web.archive.org/web/20160322052708/http://abcnews.com.co/

completely false articles made up 2.6 percent of all hard-news articles late in the 2016 campaign: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf In total, articles on proTrump or pro-Clinton fake news websites represented an average of approximately 2.6% of all the articles Americans read on sites focusing on hard news topics during this period. The pro-Trump or pro-Clinton fake news that people read was heavily skewed toward Donald Trump people saw an average (mean) of 5.45 articles from fake news websites during the study period of October 7 November 14, 2016. Nearly all of these were pro-Trump (average of 5.00 pro-Trump articles).

in the last 3 months of the 2016 election, the 20 most popular false election stories generated 1.3 million more Facebook engagements than the 20 most popular legitimate stories: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook

a significant portion of the population -- about 10% -- believes that InfoWars is credible: https://morningconsult.com/2016/12/07/poll-majority-find-major-media-outlets-credible/

fake news spreads faster than true news: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/359/6380/1146.full.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/08/scientists-truth-fiction-twitter-bots

ad hominem attacks against science reduce the credibility of science: http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0192025 https://www.psypost.org/2018/02/study-suggests-attacking-motives-scientists-just-effective-attacking-science-50746

people with weaker cognitive ability have a harder time judging fake news objectively: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289617301617 https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cognitive-ability-and-vulnerability-to-fake-news/

delusional, dogmatic, and fundamentalist people have a harder time judging fake news as fake: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3172140 http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/05/people-who-are-delusional-dogmatic-or-religious-fundamentalists-are-more-likely-to-believe-fake-news/

social exclusion increases belief in conspiracy theories: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103116304711 https://psychcentral.com/news/2017/02/18/social-exclusion-leads-to-belief-in-conspiracy-theories/116589.html

most people (and most young people) have a hard time sifting fact from fiction: https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:fv751yt5934/SHEG%20Evaluating%20Information%20Online.pdf [A]t each level -- middle school, high school, and college -- these variations paled in comparison to a stunning and dismaying consistency. Overall, young people's ability to reason about the information on the Internet can be summed up in one word: bleak.

Craft 2017: people with better understandings of news is produced are significantly less likely to believe in conspiracy theories (1 additional answer on the News Media Knowledge Scale correlated with a -0.3 of 4 [7.5% if Likert is linear] reduction in conspiracy theory endorsement): https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/11/171130150424.htm http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2057047317725539 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/2057047317725539 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/824668168479440926/craft2017.pdf

education can reduce belief in fake news: https://www.irex.org/project/learn-discern-l2d-media-literacy-training https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/node/resource/impact-study-media-literacy-ukraine.pdf Compared to the control group, L2D participants were: 28% more likely to demonstrate sophisticated knowledge of the news media industry[.] 25% more likely to self-report checking multiple news sources[.] 13% more likely to correctly identify and critically analyze a fake news story[.] 4% more likely to express a sense of agency over what news sources they can access[.]

old people, Republicans, and conservatives are more likely to share fake news: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/10/older-people-more-likely-to-share-fake-news-on-facebook http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/1/eaau4586.full https://sci-hub.se/10.1126/sciadv.aau4586

fake news is disproportionately consumed by the right: https://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf

^ source of fake news: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.31.2.211 https://sci-hub.se/10.1257/jep.31.2.211

fake news is disproportionately consumed by the right: http://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2018-02-06-trump-supporters-and-extreme-right-share-widest-range-junk-news http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2018/02/Polarization-Partisanship-JunkNews.pdf http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/polarization-partisanship-and-junk-news/ On Twitter, a network of Trump supporters consumes the largest volume of junk news, and junk news is the largest proportion of news links they share.

young people are better able to identify opinion from fact: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/23/younger-americans-are-better-than-older-americans-at-telling-factual-news-statements-from-opinions/

of American conservatives, only a minority trust sources other than Fox News and talk radio: http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/section-1-media-sources-distinct-favorites-emerge-on-the-left-and-right/

republicans are more likely than democrats to believe fake news and less likely to believe true news: https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews.pdf

Project Veritas uses cuts to maliciously misrepresent people. compare PV's cut-down video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cWptWsSzSh4 (2:52) versus this: https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/james-okeefe-and-post-reporter-exchange-what-really-happened/2017/11/27/668d558e-d3c5-11e7-9ad9-ca0619edfa05_video.html (4:44)

watch a Project Veritas "sting" operative get owned by WaPo journalists: https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/a-woman-approached-the-post-with-dramatic--and-false--tale-about-roy-moore-sje-appears-to-be-part-of-undercover-sting-operation/2017/11/27/0c2e335a-cfb6-11e7-9d3a-bcbe2af58c3a_story.html

watch the founder of Project Vertias avoid answering any questions about that fishing expedition: https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/project-veritas-founder-james-okeefe-avoids-post-reporters-questions/2017/11/27/a664414c-d3af-11e7-9ad9-ca0619edfa05_video.html

fox news viewers are more uninformed than those that consume no media at all (2012 poll): http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2012/confirmed/final.pdf https://www.inquisitr.com/241677/study-fox-news-viewers-less-informed-than-those-who-watch-no-news-at-all/

^ a more recent study found that fox news viewers are pretty typical (for just 3 questions): http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2015/false/

fox news thought that antifa was going to start a civil war on 04 November 2017: https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/November_4th_Antifa_Civil_War

fox news edited out booing at two trump events: https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-booed-ufc-fight-video-fox-friends-cheers-2019-11 https://www.mediamatters.org/fox-friends/fox-friends-edits-boos-out-video-trump-attending-world-series

Kennedy and Hartig 2019: response rates to Pew's telephone surveys have declined from 36% in 1996 to 6% in 2019: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/27/response-rates-in-telephone-surveys-have-resumed-their-decline/

Guterbock Benson Lavrakas 2018: the average cost per completed interview among 25 polling organizations was ~$45: https://www.surveypractice.org/article/3168-the-changing-costs-of-random-digital-dial-cell-phone-and-landline-interviewing

national presidential and Congressional polls in the United States are relatively accurate, with a consistent 5-7% error rate over the past 20 years: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-polls-are-all-right/

polls are not the same as projections: **POLLS** predict **WHAT PROPORTION** of votes X candidate will get --> "Hillary Clinton will get 48% of the popular vote countrywide". **PROJECTIONS** predict **HOW LIKELY** it is that X candidate will win --> "Hillary Clinton has a 3 in 4 chance to win in the 2016 election". In short: https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-election-forecast/

polls are not the same as projections: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1wZphSHtnAg

polls said that Clinton would receive 48.5% of the vote, Trump 44.9%, and Johnson 5.0%: https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-election-forecast/ the Federal Elections Commission says: Clinton received 48.18% of the vote, Trump 46.09%, and Johnson 3.28%: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election,_2016 https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf the polls overestimated Clinton by 0.3%, underestimated Trump by 1.2%, and overestimated Johnson by 1.7% (just 3.2% off)

rcp: https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_clinton-5491.html https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_clinton_vs_johnson_vs_stein-5952.html

polls said that Democrats would receive 50.7% of the vote and Republicans 42.0% (ratio: 1.207): https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-generic-ballot-polls/ Democrats received 53.4% of the vote and Republicans 44.8% (ratio: 1.192, 1.25% off): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections

projections put Democrats at gaining 39 seats in the House and losing 1 in the Senate: https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2018-midterm-election-forecast/house/ Democrats gained 41 seats in the House and lost 2 in the Senate: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_United_States_Senate_elections

projections put Democrats at governing 24 states and Republicans at 26: https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2018-midterm-election-forecast/governor/ Democrats now govern 23 states and Republicans 27: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_United_States_gubernatorial_elections

instant runoff voting (ranked choice voting) has majority support, particularly among the young and Democrats: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#the-future-of-democracy/3

most people wouldn't change their minds if presented with scientific evidence: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#the-common-good/2

2/3 of people prefer common sense over science, particularly the old and less-educated: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#common-sense

1/2 of people think correlation means causation: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#knowledge-is-power/2

most people who think they're well-informed on economics also cannot name a single economist: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#the-dismal-science/2

Republicans are much more likely to believe that there's a Deep State and the Parkland school shooting was a hoax: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#conspiracy-theories

most Republicans don't think the USA has interfered with the democratic elections of another nation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_involvement_in_regime_change https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/08/Map_of_US_involvement_in_regime_change_and_election_interference.svg

Republicans are more likely to think they're well-informed on economics, less able to name a living economist, and less able to name the 3 branches of government (but equally likely to think correlation == causation): https://thepulseofthenation.com/#red-team-vs-blue-team

most people who support a border wall think they could get past one: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#border-wall/2

29% of Trump supporters would vote for him if he murdered a journalist: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#the-truth/2

Republicans hate weed because Democrats are having sex: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#sex-without-love/4

most Democrats who think men and women are equal think that women are better multitaskers and better empathizers: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#gender-equality/3

Republicans would rather be dumb and happy than smart and sad: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#dumb-and-happy/1

Gallup: in 2018 (1949), Americans described socialism as "equal in distribution" by 23% (12%), as "state control of business" by 17% (34%), as "social services free" by 10% (2%), as "modified communism" by 6% (6%), as "talking to people" by 6% (N/A), as "restriction of freedom" by 3% (1%), "liberal government" by 2% (1%), as a "cooperative plan" by 1% (1%), or using negative adjectives only by 6% (2%): https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/243362/meaning-socialism-americans-today.aspx

Pew 2019: Americans with a positive view of socialism argue it improves fairness&equality (31%), builds upon capitalism (20%), point to historical successes (6%); Americans with a negative view of socialism argue it undermines work ethic or increases dependence on gov't (19%), point to historical failures (18%), or undermines democracy (17%): https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/10/07/in-their-own-words-behind-americans-views-of-socialism-and-capitalism/

Pew 2019: Americans with a positive view of capitalism argue it promotes individual opportunity (24%) or is essential to America (20%); Americans with a negative view of capitalism argue it unequally benefits a small few (23%), is exploitative/corrupt by nature (20%), or undermines democracy (8%): https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/10/07/in-their-own-words-behind-americans-views-of-socialism-and-capitalism/

Data For Progress 2020: most Americans identify capitalism closer with "freedom to pursue individual interests" than "the economy is controlled by a small group of wealthy individuals"; most Americans identify capitalism closer with "government empowers workers to have a say and provides ... health care, housing, free education" than gov't "has total control over the economy and business": https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2022/1/26/democratic-socialism-and-socialism-are-increasingly-salient-among-democrats https://archive.ph/AFxZh

Data For Progress 2020: Americans who support more of 4 social-democratic policies (Medicare For All, expanded UI, paid sick leave, job guarantee) are more likely to support "a form of socialism in the US"; or, socialism correlates with social democracy: https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2020/6/10/how-americans-feel-about-socialism https://archive.ph/Mrybg

Data For Progress 2020: likely voters have a +25% opinion of capitalism and -20% opinion of socialism; after being asked the above descriptions, they were significantly (6%) more likely to support "democratic socialism": https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2022/1/26/democratic-socialism-and-socialism-are-increasingly-salient-among-democrats https://archive.ph/AFxZh

Gallup 2021: a significant portion of Americans are favorable to both capitalism and socialism; of Dems, 34% like both, 17% like capitalism only, 28% like socialism only, 16% dislike both: https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/358178/deconstructing-americans-views-socialism-capitalism.aspx https://archive.ph/IFKzq

2018: the "radical left's agenda" (end cash bail, government-produced generic drugs, public job guarantee, public internet) is more popular than the mainstream republican's agenda: http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/08/the-radical-lefts-agenda-is-more-popular-than-the-gops.html https://www.dataforprogress.org/polling-the-left-agenda/

2018: a majority of Republicans now support Medicare for All; a majority of Americans support free college: https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-progressives/#interactives-poll

2019: most voters support student loan forgiveness: https://morningconsult.com/2019/05/08/voters-favor-elizabeth-warren-student-debt-loan-plan/

2016: the portion of americans supporting wealth redistribution is basically the same as in 1980: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-young-democrats-love-bernie-sanders/

US 1990-2018: just 6% more people oppose a "rich class" in 2018 (58% yes) than in 1990 (62% yes): https://news.gallup.com/poll/235439/partisan-divide-benefit-having-rich-people-expands.aspx https://news.gallup.com/poll/154619/americans-having-rich-class-years-ago.aspx

US 2021: 29% say that billionaires existing is a bad thing; 55% say neither; 15% say good thing: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/07/28/americans-views-about-billionaires-have-grown-somewhat-more-negative-since-2020/

US 2019: Americans want to tax billionaires but not eliminate them: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/wealth-inequality-billionaires-poll_n_5c7d98d8e4b069b2129ec865 https://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/athena/files/2019/02/28/5c78213ee4b010e7c5653787.pdf

Data For Progress 2019: https://www.vox.com/recode/22356742/billionaires-amazon-jeff-bezos-rich-philanthropy-coronavirus-election https://www.vox.com/recode/2021/3/30/22357510/poll-billioniares-data-for-progress-vox-wealth-philanthropy-inequality https://www.filesforprogress.org/datasets/2021/3/dfp-recode-voters-attitudes-billionaires.pdf

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Gallup 2018: the current generation is the most socialist generation: https://news.gallup.com/poll/240725/democrats-positive-socialism-capitalism.aspx

Harvard 2016: the American youth support socialism: http://iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/content/160425_Harvard%20IOP%20Spring%20Report_update.pdf

Pew 2011: the American youth support socialism: http://www.people-press.org/2011/12/28/little-change-in-publics-response-to-capitalism-socialism/

YouGov 2015: the American youth support socialism: https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2015/05/11/one-third-millennials-like-socialism

US 2010-2021: capitalism from 60% positive to 60% positive, socialism 37% positive to 38% positive: https://news.gallup.com/poll/357755/socialism-capitalism-ratings-unchanged.aspx

US 2011: socialism 31% positive, 60% negative; capitalism 50% positive, 40% negative http://www.people-press.org/2011/12/28/little-change-in-publics-response-to-capitalism-socialism/

US 1990-2012: "the US benefits from having a class of rich people": yes 62% to 63%, no 32% to 34%: http://www.people-press.org/2010/05/04/socialism-not-so-negative-capitalism-not-so-positive/

US 2016: very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable: socialism 5%, 24%, 18%, 30%; capitalism 21%, 31%, 18%, 9%; describe self as socialist 9%, as capitalist 27%: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/467z1ta5ys/tabs_OP_Socialism_20160127.pdf

US 2015 October: very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable; socialism 7%, 18%, 15%, 32%; capitalism 20%, 28%, 17%, 11%; describe self as socialist 9%, as capitalist 30%: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/x8miy3gp2f/tabs_OPI_Democratic_Nomination_20151016.pdf

US 2015 May: very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable; socialism 6%, 20%, 19%, 32%; capitalism 24%, 28%, 17%, 9% http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/3csd07d2dd/tabs_OPI_socialism_20150508.pdf

American Culture and Faith 2017: 37% prefer socialism to capitalism https://www.culturefaith.com/acfi-survey-reveals-details-about-the-ideology-gap-separating-americans/

Reason-Rupe 2014: of US millenials, 52% capitalism better system, 42% socialism better system; 64% free market economy better system, 32% economy managed by government better system: report: http://reason.com/assets/db/14048862817887.pdf toplines: http://reason.com/assets/db/14048863511533.pdf

Victims of Communism 2017 October: prefer to live in country that is X: 59% capitalist, 34% socialist, 4% fascist, 3% communist

Victims of Communism 2016: very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable; socialism 7%, 22%, 17%, 30%; capitalism 24%, 25%, 17%, 12%: toplines: http://web.archive.org/web/20161024041530/https://www.victimsofcommunism.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/VOC-Attitudes-toward-Socialism-Topline-Data.pdf

different generations have different voting patterns (ie, they didn't change very much as they aged): http://www.people-press.org/2011/11/03/section-1-how-generations-have-changed/

your political views are three times more malleable in your teens than in your midlife: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/08/upshot/how-the-year-you-were-born-influences-your-politics.html http://archive.is/0S3vo http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/cohort_voting_20140605.pdf

political views solidify in your teens: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/09/the-politics-of-american-generations-how-age-affects-attitudes-and-voting-behavior/ https://books.google.com/books?id=3a927Jder6IC#v=onepage On an individual level, of course, many people s political views evolve over the course of their lives. But academic research indicates not only that generations have distinct political identities, but that most people s basic outlooks and orientations are set fairly early on in life. As one famous longitudinal study of Bennington College women put it, through late childhood and early adolescence, attitudes are relatively malleable with the potential for dramatic change possible in late adolescence or early adulthood. [B]ut greater stability sets in at some early point, and attitudes tend to be increasingly persistent as people age. [unformatted redo]

brits become more conservative as they age, but it's not associated with most significant life events: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/03/do-we-become-more-conservative-with-age-young-old-politics https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379413000875 https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.007 Ageing makes people more likely to vote Conservative. The question of whether future Conservative support is threatened by generational replacement can therefore be answered with some confidence in the negative. Newer generations are not less Conservative than older generations once ageing effects are controlled for using side information taken from the panel studies. There are nonetheless identifiable political generations. Individuals born in certain years appear more or less Conservative, ignoring trend effects, depending on the prevailing political conditions at the time that they entered the electorate. [....] Given the increasing longevity of the electorate and the increased proportion who are elderly, our findings indicate that over time we should expect to see an increasingly Conservative electorate. [....] The elderly are not Conservative because they are rich, but because they are elderly. [....] While we can rule out some social ageing effects (due to marriage, income changes and so forth), we do not know exactly why people become more supportive of the right as they age. [unformatted redo]

the public consistently believes that crime is going up even when it's not: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/16/voters-perceptions-of-crime-continue-to-conflict-with-reality/

the public consistently believes that crime is going up even when it's not: https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2017/02/27/why-the-american-public-seems-allergic-to-facts/

2019 HarrisX poll: 62% of white respondents believe that "whites are discriminated against in America to any extent"; just 31% of Gen Z believe this: https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-thinking/433270-poll-republicans-and-democrats-differ-strongly-on-whether-white

2018 Pew Poll: younger Republicans are much more likely (2x) to say that "blacks are treated less fairly than whites": http://www.people-press.org/2018/03/01/the-generation-gap-in-american-politics/

2017 PPRI poll: https://www.prri.org/research/mtv-culture-and-religion/ https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/PRRI-MTV-Survey-Report-FINAL.pdf https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/PRRI-MTV-Topline-FINAL.pdf favorable views of Trump: 35% white young people, 46% white people; white people experience discrimination as serious as discrimination against other groups: 36% white young people, 55% white people

2019 Pew poll: Gen Z is less racist, more leftist, and more trans-accepting: http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/01/17/generation-z-looks-a-lot-like-millennials-on-key-social-and-political-issues/

2018 National Election Pool (NEP) exit polls: 18-24 year-olds voted heavily for Democrats: https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/exit-polls

2017 PPRI poll: https://www.prri.org/research/mtv-culture-and-religion/ https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/PRRI-MTV-Survey-Report-FINAL.pdf https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/PRRI-MTV-Topline-FINAL.pdf Gen Z voted 59.5% Clinton, 28.3% Trump, 12% other. Gen Z has net favorability of -35 for the Republican Party, +17 Democratic Party, -44 US-Mexico border wall, -26 Muslim ban, +50 gay marriage, +31 legal marijuana, -22 birth-gender bathrooms, and -44 making abortion.

2016 Populus poll: https://www.varkeyfoundation.org/media/4487/global-young-people-report-single-pages-new.pdf USA: 90% strongly agree or agree that men and women should be treated equally, 83% that transgender people should have the same rights as non-transgender people, 63% that safe abortion should be available legally to women that need it, 71% that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry

2016 UCLA college freshmen survey: https://www.heri.ucla.edu/monographs/TheAmericanFreshman2016.pdf

2016 National Election Pool (NEP) exit polls: 18-29 year-olds voted heavily for Clinton and for Democrats: https://edition.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls/national/president

2016 CCES survey: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/opinion/sunday/democracy-democrats-voters-disenfranchisment.html

2015 CGK poll: https://genhq.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Research-White-Paper-Gen-Zs-Political-Civic-Outlook-c-2016-The-Center-for-Generational-Kinetics.pdf 33% GenZ vs 39% Millenials vs 29% other more access after the Affordable Care Act; 33% GenZ vs 39% Millenials vs 43% other think minorities have equal access for success in business; 54% GenZ vs 60% millenial vs 69% other think illegal immigration is a problem in the US

2014 Northwestern University poll: https://www.psandl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Innovation_Summit_GenZ_Topline_Report.pdf total agree: 64% big corporations and banks control too much in American society, 61% the gap between rich and poor Americans is harmful to my generation, 73% it's better for America to be a place with people of many races and languages rather than a country that is less diverse, 53% college should be free for everybody, 73% everyone should have the right to marry regardless of sexual orientation, 74% transgender people should have equal rights, 64% healthcare should be free for everyone, 55% everyone should have a right to become a US citizen regardless of where they were born and how they came to the country

The Gild (consultancy company) poll was not a representative sample of Generation Z -- it was an online poll that anyone could participate in (including you, if only the page didn't 404 nowadays): https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleystahl/2017/08/11/why-democrats-should-be-losing-sleep-over-generation-z/#66d23b207878 http://afterthemillennials.com/why-generation-z-is-not-more-conservative/

2016 Houghton Mifflin Harcourt (book company) survey: https://www.hmhco.com/about-us/press-releases/one-vote-2016-results 47% Clinton, 41% Trump, 12% other

the fall 2016 poll found 32% supported Trump, 22% Clinton: https://hispanicheritage.org/my-college-options-hispanic-heritage-foundation-present-findings-of-national-survey-over-100k-high-school-students-on-2016-presidential-election-and-attitudes-on-key-issues/ https://public.tableau.com/profile/mycollegeoptions#!/vizhome/PresidentialPolling-Fall2016/PresidentialPolling2016

yet the spring 2016 poll found 30% supported Sanders, 12% Clinton, 18% Trump, 8% Cruz, 7% Rubio, 6% Carson; 43% support Democrats, 40% Republicans: https://public.tableau.com/profile/mycollegeoptions#!/vizhome/PresidentialDashboard-Spring2016/PresidentialPolling2016

and the poll itself was a merely distributed to teachers, not students -- making it very unlikely to be representative of the nation as a whole: https://hispanicheritage.org/my-college-options-hispanic-heritage-foundation-present-findings-of-national-survey-over-100k-high-school-students-on-2016-presidential-election-and-attitudes-on-key-issues/

The studies below show that lots of specific methods work. In my opinion, the correct synthesis of these results is that basically *all* methods of persuasion work. While some may work better than others, and may work better on different people, evidence works, logic works, debate works, empathy works, humor works.

Orosz et al 2016: ridicule & humor (making fun of inconsistencies and of believers in the conspiracy) and logical breakdown (providing stats and explaining logical failures) are equally effective at reducing belief in a Jewish superconspiracy, though the effect size is not large (~3 points on an 88-point scale (3.4pp): https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01525/full https://sci-hub.st/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01525/full https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/804880189695852595/orosz2016.pdf

Kalla and Broockman 2016: deep canvassing (having a ~10 minute conversation encouraging the person to consider a trans person's perspective) increased tolerance of transgender people (~.3 SD) and support for a gender nondiscrimination law (~.5 points on -3 to +3 scale); these effects persisted and strengthened after 3 months, and were robust to a fake negative ad against the law: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/magazine/how-do-you-change-voters-minds-have-a-conversation.html http://science.sciencemag.org/content/352/6282/220 http://sci-hub.st/10.1126/science.aad9713 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/801830550729129984/broockman2016.pdf Defining transgender in the item wording revealed that placebo subjects were less supportive of protecting this group (P < 0.05, one-tailed). Next, all subjects were less supportive after viewing an opposing ad, but the effect of the conversations endured (P < 0.05, one-tailed). However, the ads impact dissipated, whereas the conversations effect endured (P < 0.05, one-tailed).

Kalla and Broockman 2020: conversations that used both {convincing arguments and compassion} durably reduced anti-immigration sentiment and transphobia; conversations that used only {convincing arguments} had insignificant effects; this was found in face-to-face, video, and phone interventions: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/reducing-exclusionary-attitudes-through-interpersonal-conversation-evidence-from-three-field-experiments/4AA5B97806A4CAFBAB0651F5DAD8F223 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/895135046011322388/kalla2020.pdf

Wood et al 2018: there is no evidence for a consistent "backfire effect"; telling people facts generally changes their minds; among 10100 adults, the effect of factual correction was ~1/3 as large as the effect of ideology on stated belief: https://mindhacks.com/2018/01/03/the-backfire-effect-is-elusive/ https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-018-9443-y https://sci-hub.se/10.1007/s11109-018-9443-y https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/874024449693872168/wood2018.pdf

The present paper presents results from five experiments in which we enrolled more than 10,100 subjects and tested 52 issues of potential backfire. Across all experiments, we found no corrections capable of triggering backfire, despite testing precisely the kinds of polarized issues where backfire should be expected. Evidence of factual backfire is far more tenuous than prior research suggests.

^ list of factual correction: https://static-content.springer.com/esm/art%3A10.1007%2Fs11109-018-9443-y/MediaObjects/11109_2018_9443_MOESM1_ESM.pdf

Schmid and Betsch 2019: experimental study: among 1661 adults, topic rebuttal (oppose misinformation with facts) and technique rebuttal (refute the methods that science deniers use to mislead their audience) substantially and significantly reduced the influence of science deniers (by about 1/3 of a standard deviation), especially among individuals who vulnerable to antiscience beliefs: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-to-debate-a-science-denier/ https://archive.ph/1oWEo https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0632-4 https://sci-hub.se/10.1038/s41562-019-0632-4 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1017236881374715985/schmid2019.pdf https://osf.io/xx2kt/

Tappin 2021: against "partisan motivated reasoning": among 5071 adults, evidence changed minds in a sample of 24 policy issues; no significant difference between "evidence + contrary party leader cue" (purple) vs "evidence alone" (black): https://psyarxiv.com/247bs/ https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/895135650540564500/tappin2021.pdf Altogether, our design incorporates 48 unique arguments and evidence (information) treatments, and we recruit a total of 5,071 American adults corresponding to 25,181 observations. The experiment design is as follows.

Nyhan et al 2014: after factual correction, people who reported least favorable to vaccines were actually 20pp less likely to report being "very likely" to give the MMR vaccine to another child, if they had one: https://publications.aap.org/pediatrics/article-abstract/133/4/e835/32713/Effective-Messages-in-Vaccine-Promotion-A?autologincheck=redirected?nfToken=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 https://sci-hub.se/10.1542/peds.2013-2365 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1019404589155500062/nyhan2014.pdf

Jangles Sciencelad: "In Defense of Debate": overviews some of the major strengths and weakness of debate as a propagandistic/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qdYOaM0YH9E

Omelicheva and Avdeyeva 2008: among 60 undergrads, debate achieved higher deep knowing in students: compared to lectures, undergrad students who observed debates had insignificantly lower knowledge (recollection of fact) and significantly higher comprehension (ability to explain fact), application (applying concept to unrelated situation), and evaluation (using concept to judge reality): https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/abs/teaching-with-lecture-or-debate-testing-the-effectiveness-of-traditional-versus-active-learning-methods-of-instruction/3CCA1F6C678593BAE683F6FBFE2CEE55 https://sci-hub.st/10.1017/S1049096508080815 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/941139776277475368/omelicheva2008.pdf n=60 undergrads

The tests demonstrated that in our classes students acquired better comprehension, application, and critical evaluation skills when a controversial topic was taught in the debate format. With regard to basic knowledge, lectures better facilitated students memorization, recall, and recognition of information, however, this finding was only significant at the .10 level.

Colbert 1987: non-experimental evidence: among 248 undergrads, measured two weeks before and two weeks after inter-collegiate competitive debate began, debaters saw significantly more positive changes in critical thinking skills compared to nondebaters: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00028533.1987.11951345 https://sci-hub.se/10.1080/00028533.1987.11951345 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1017216449821020220/colbert2018.pdf

Shinn 1995: todo reread xxx: after controlling for intelligence, high school students who engaged in two years of competitive debating exhibited higher levels of critical thinking than a comparison group of nondebaters: [Effects of high school debating on critical thinking ability. Unpublished master's thesis. University of Washington, Seattle.] https://orbiscascade-washington.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01ALLIANCE_UW/1juclfo/alma99128047210001452

Bowie 2009: todo reread xxx: https://meridian.allenpress.com/jbsw/article-abstract/14/1/63/463572/Undergraduate-Social-Welfare-Policy-Debates-An https://sci-hub.se/10.18084/basw.14.1.q3214762694g8473

This research empirically assessed the learning outcomes of structured debates in an undergraduate social welfare policy course. The longitudinal mixed-method study represents the only one in the literature on social policy debates in undergraduate social work education. For the five cohorts of students surveyed, the Policy Debate Rating Scale assessed learning outcomes on cognitive, behavioral/affective, and comparative perspective dimensions. The results showed strong evidence of higher level learning and supports the use of active learning to promote critical thinking, public speaking, and policy practice skills among social workers. Implications for future policy practice such as the need for more instruction on dialectics, differential perspectives, and improved designs for future research are discussed.

Kennedy 2009: among 87 undergraduates: among debate participants, debate contributed to their understanding of the subject "a lot" for 83% and "some" for 17%; among debate observers, "a lot" for 44%, "some" for 48%, and "a little" for 8% https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1469787409343186 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/1469787409343186 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1021669848033525882/kennedy2009.pdf

Mumtaz and Latif 2017: self-report: among 182 female second-year medical students in Saudi Arabia, the vast majority reported that educational debate improved their critical thinking (78%), speaking and presentation skills (71%), and understanding of hearing from diverse viewpoints (80%): https://journals.physiology.org/doi/full/10.1152/advan.00157.2016 https://sci-hub.se/10.1152/advan.00157.2016 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/962824535944593418/mumtaz2017.pdf

Keller Whittaker Burke 2001: among 22 undergraduate students, self-rated knowledge increased after both observing traditional lecture and observing debates (this difference was not significant); in contrast, students who participated in a debate rated their knowledge as significantly higher than either other group: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22475508/ https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10437797.2001.10779059 https://sci-hub.se/10.1080/10437797.2001.10779059 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1021669049496768592/keller2001.pdf

Hypothesis 2. Change s in self-reported knowledge associated with observing a d e b a te we re no different than changes in self-r eported knowledge for topics presented through traditional instruction (z=0.03, p=.97). Half of the students ( n =11) reported larger average increases in knowledge on observed debate topics, and the other h alf reported larger average gains on topics covered through traditional instruction . Hypothesis 3. Increases in knowledge ratings associated with debating a specific topic were significantly greater than increases in knowledge ratings for topics presented through traditional instruction (z=3.54, p <.001). For the majority of students ( n=17), the gain in reported knowledge on the ir debated topic was greater than their average gain on topics covered in traditional fashion (lower for four stud ents, equal for one student).

Combs and Bourne 1989: among 59 upper-level business students, asked to compared to their perceptions of a standard lecture format, 80% believed debates provided them a better understanding of both sides of the issues; 66% felt they had learned more; confidence in public speaking skills increased following the debates; and students enjoying the debates increased from 57% to 85%: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/108056998905200209 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/108056998905200209 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1021696769878401075/combs1989.pdf

Combs and Bourne 1994: extended their initial study to cover a fiveyear period with a combined sample of over 500 students. The results were even stronger in favor of using debates: https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ505291 http://celt.miamioh.edu/ject/issue.php?v=5&n=1 http://web.archive.org/web/20140427043654/http://celt.miamioh.edu/ject/issue.php?v=5&n=1 [unavailable]

Helenius et al 2006: among 33 internal medicine residents, a debate on routine breast cancer screening for women in their 40's increased the confidence of residents in discussing the pros and cons of mammography with their patients and confidence that their views are supported by scientific evidence: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17144832/ https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15328015tlm1804_3 https://sci-hub.se/10.1207/s15328015tlm1804_3 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1021667759916068926/helenius2006.pdf

Chen et al 2022: among 76 sophomore undergrads, educational debate winners demonstrated higher critical thinking (as evaluated by the instructor) than their opponents: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1871187122000384 https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.tsc.2022.101035 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1017216725080613024/chen2022.pdf (score == 40 is a win, score == 35 is a tie, score == 30 is a loss)

Results indicated that: (1) averagely speaking, the winning team demonstrated a higher depth of critical thinking, and their number of speeches was relatively more than that of the teams with lower debate scores; (2) debaters depth of critical thinking was negatively correlated to their number of speeches; (3) audiences depth of critical thinking was not significantly correlated to their number of online posts; (4) debaters overall depth of critical thinking was relatively lower than that of audiences.

McAvoy and McAvoy 2021: among 165 high school students, compared to deliberative small group activity, students in the debate condition reported less respect, more hesitation to speak, less satisfaction, and lower participation: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0161956X.2021.1942706 https://sci-hub.se/10.1080/0161956X.2021.1942706 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/962824033022406666/mcavoy2021.pdf

Kennedy 2009: among 87 undergraduates (88.5% female), the proportion of people who thought they "would consider having their students participate in a debate" increased after observing 5 debates on a topic from 75% to 85%; this suggests that, despite their anxiety, they thought the process was useful on net: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1469787409343186 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/1469787409343186 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1021669848033525882/kennedy2009.pdf

Dundes 2001: in one sociology class of 30 students, 1-on-1 debates following preparation of a cited outline increased speaker confidence, as subjectively determined by the one teacher: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1318721 https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ661938 https://sci-hub.se/10.2307/1318721 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1021675810043736094/dundes2001.pdf

Tumposky 2004: debate is exclusive to women, who feel much less comfortable in adversarial conversations: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.3200/TCHS.78.2.52-56 https://sci-hub.st/10.3200/TCHS.78.2.52-56 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/941146035655417856/tumposky2004.pdf

In her study of how males and females communicate, sociolinguist Tannen (1992) found that an adversarial environment is antithetical to the way most females learn and like to interact. She also notes that most women are more comfortable speaking in private to a small group of people they know well (1992, 7). Other research suggests that very few women are comfortable with adversarial argument, in or out of classrooms. In an interview study with American college students, researchers found that the classic dormitory bull session with students assailing their opponents logic and attacking their evidence, seems to occur rarely among women (Belenky et al. 1986, 105).

McAvoy and McAvoy 2021: among 165 high school students, young women were more likely to report hearing something offensive in small group discussion than debate, and equally likely to report hesitance to speak in both activities: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0161956X.2021.1942706 https://sci-hub.se/10.1080/0161956X.2021.1942706 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/962824033022406666/mcavoy2021.pdf

Lilly 2012: among 132 undergraduates, most debaters shifted their views toward the position that they were defending: https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ977172 https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ977172.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1016961779055722526/lillyl2012.pdf

Kennedy 2009: among 87 undergraduates, most debaters shifted their views toward the position that they were defending: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1469787409343186 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/1469787409343186 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1021669848033525882/kennedy2009.pdf

Gorard et al 2015: randomized-control trial (RCT): among 3159 children aged 9-10, receiving philosophy education significantly and substantially improved academic performance or social-emotional learning: https://qz.com/635002/teaching-kids-philosophy-makes-them-smarter-in-math-and-english/ https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/projects-and-evaluation/projects/philosophy-for-children https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1016963114979307520/Gorand2015.pdf

Lord et al 2021: randomized-control trial (RCT): among 3601 children aged 9-10, receiving philosophy education did not significantly improved academic performance or social-emotional learning: https://www.theguardian.com/education/2021/mar/03/research-undermines-claims-philosophy-boosts-primary-maths-and-reading https://dailynous.com/2021/03/04/philosophy-for-kids-is-not-math-for-kids-or-reading-for-kids/ https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/projects-and-evaluation/projects/philosophy-for-children-effectiveness-trial https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1016966929174499389/lord2021.pdf

Maddox and Creech 2021: Contrapoint's strategy keeps "with agonistic debate strategies" (agonistic meaning competive discourse, as opposed to deliberative discourse): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1527476420953549 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/1527476420953549 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1024437879218372638/maddox2020.pdf

One profile notes Contra[Points] may not have all of the answers, but she has one: meet them on their turf and outdo them (Singal 2017). The profile goes on to say, Wynn. . .actually engages with the arguments she is disagreeing with, showing why they are wrong rather simply pointing at them and laughing or screaming (Singal 2017). In keeping with agonistic debate strategies, ContraPoints videos will invoke the extremist viewpoint in question, dismantle it, and avoid dismissing the view as only racist, sexist, or transphobic. In an interview with Vice, Wynn defends her strategies, stating, From a psychological standpoint, you have to empathetically enter a person s world; not just why do they think what they think but why do they feel what they feel? Repeat that back to them and you can really gain traction (Hall and Brownstein 2019). Similarly, a Los Angeles Times profile features praise from one of Wynn s LeftTube peers: Natalie speaks their language, Ellis says. That s something a lot of leftists can t do. They can t reach these borderline edgelord communities because they don t speak the language of memes or why these people tend to fall down reactionary alt-right rabbit holes. (Fleishman 2019) ContraPoints succeeds where others fail.

Maddox and Creech 2021: "ContraPoints approach works because it engages with epistemological assumptions" rather than "shaming people for holding those assumptions": https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1527476420953549 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/1527476420953549 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1024437879218372638/maddox2020.pdf

It is the implicit appeal of Wynn s style that is often cited as the core to her deradicalizing strategy (CBC Radio 2019; Loewinger 2019). In a 2019 episode of National Public Radio s On the Media, hosts interviewed one young man who attributed his turn away from extreme right-wing content to ContraPoints: It started off as hate watching and then it became, you know, Mmm, I don t hate her. She s funny. And once you get rid of that hate you can start to actually listen to what she s saying. . . I couldn t tell you what it is about them, but you do not feel like you are being attacked. That s when I started to deradicalize, so to speak. (Loewinger 2019). As the quotation suggests, ContraPoints approach works because it engages with epistemological assumptions, in lieu of shaming people for holding those assumptions. Once again citing the LA Times interview with LeftTuber Lindsay Ellis, Jeffrey Fleishman writes, [Ellis] was impressed that Wynn realized that shaming people might feel righteous but doesn t change minds, especially if you re trying to alter the thinking of right-wing and other extremist groups (Fleishman 2019). Similarly, Vice reports, Wynn acknowledges that to deradicalize someone you have to engage with their ideas, but this method isn t exactly popular (Hall and Brownstein 2019) and CBC Radio notes that ContraPoints debunk[s] the rationales behind those views, but also convey[s] in her videos that they weren t monsters. They were merely lost (CBC Radio 2019). The journalistic discourse surrounding ContraPoints sets the terms for understanding deradicalization as a valuable end, positioning Wynn s dialogic method as an ideal means. This is one reason why ContraPoints work has been described as the beginnings of a blueprint for countering the rise of right-wing extremist and indoctrination content on the video-sharing site (Singal 2017). With this is mind, we now turn to unpacking that blueprint.

Maddox and Creech 2021: Contrapoints "articulates a critical logic that her own audiences can choose to take as their own by detailing logical gaps and flaws in evidence and argumentation, a strategy key to agonistic debate": https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1527476420953549 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/1527476420953549 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1024437879218372638/maddox2020.pdf

Deconstructing the premise grants her visibility by making the content legible within YouTube s recommendation algorithm because it semantically aligns ContraPoints videos with a mass of similarly named reactionary content. Furthermore, by deconstructing premises, such as are traps gay?, she does not simply answer it with a yes or no. She shows how the issues surrounding the premise are complex, but also reflective of an underlying logic connected to power. Wynn articulates a critical logic that her own audiences can choose to take as their own by detailing logical gaps and flaws in evidence and argumentation, a strategy key to agonistic debate. In ContraPoints videos, causes and contexts are key. It is not just enough to discuss issues but to interrogate:

Maddox and Creech 2021: Contrapoint's videos attempt to insert themselves into rightist audiences and recommendations by choosing clickbait-type titles with unclear ideological backing: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1527476420953549 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/1527476420953549 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1024437879218372638/maddox2020.pdf

Lewis Marwick Partin 2021: 13 right-wing or anti-SJW response videos led to substantial harassment, as guaged by the study authors; they followed a "blueprint of harassment", where creators: [1] "addressed the audience directly" [2] "implicate their audiences by positioning them as targets" of critique by the video creator, which "directs [their] followers to see it as a personal attack" [3] use "offensive language" [4] paint their target as "irrational" and "violating norms shared between creator and audience", which "can serve as justifications for networked harassment" [5] "audience is thus encouraged to defend themselves": https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002764221989781 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/0002764221989781 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1024404169181888582/lewis2021.pdf

This blueprint for harassment is echoed in the majority of videos in our corpus. By mixing ad hominem attacks with misrepresentation and criticism of left-wing beliefs, creators stoke moral outrage in their networked audience by suggesting the vlogger is attacking or harming White people, men, children, or America, and provide a list of talking points that can be repeated when harassing a target. Thus, harassment is implicitly justified as righting a moral wrong, reinforcing the norms of the networked audience. Taken together, we argue that these phenomena the staging of a faux rational debate while simultaneously invoking moral outrage among like-minded viewers offers conditions for networked harassment even when it is not called for or is even repudiated by creators.

Lewis Marwick Partin 2021: 2 left-wing response videos (by Shaun and by Hbomberguy, respectively) did not lead to substantial harassment; authors argue that this results from staying "more faithful to the faux-staged debate format than the right-wing videos" (ie, citing "archival and scholarly sources, explaining historical events"); this results in comments that "adhere to the debate style employed by Shaun" and are "solemn and factual": https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002764221989781 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/0002764221989781 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1024404169181888582/lewis2021.pdf

Grude 2021: YouTube politics is more engaging/entertaining, which better competes for its viewers time/attention: https://bora.uib.no/bora-xmlui/handle/11250/2761211 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1024410904193925171/grude2021.pdf

Aksakal writes that taking the learners needs into account is important if the goal is to improve learning (2015, p. 1237). Politics on YouTube seem to do this in a way that traditional media fails to do. What s more, according to Van Zoonen (2005, p. 11) there is no support for the accusation that new media and what she refers to as infotainment has made citizens less informed and more apathetic. Citizen today live in a highly mediated society, and politics has to compete for people s time and attention (Ibid, p. 2-3.)

Grude 2021: YouTube politics often combines pop culture and multiple interests/hobbies, which means it competes less with other audiovisual entertainment for limited viewer time/attention: https://bora.uib.no/bora-xmlui/handle/11250/2761211 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1024410904193925171/grude2021.pdf

Though politicians often try to make themselves more likeable by acting more like celebrities performing politics (Street, 2019, p. 4), political YouTubers, especially the Casual YouTubers, were more entertaining for my informants because of a few key factors: their personalities were considered more enjoyable, they build closer bonds with the viewers and come across as just normal people, and the political content they cover is more entertaining than that of traditional politicians. When it came to the political content being more enjoyable, there were two major reasons why: the perception that politics on YouTube is more inclusive of different ideas and allows for more voices to be heard, and that politics on YouTube covers cultural politics, which was perceived to be internationally important. Political YouTubers also incorporate pop culture into their own content and use it to promote their own ideas and political stances. That way they are not competing as much for viewers time with other types of audio-visual entertainment, because their content can be entertaining on its own. Political YouTubers also have a massive advantage over traditional politicians when it comes to coming across as a regular person. What makes someone a regular person is different depending on context, but it is contrasted by what people think of as a politician, to the point where politicians now are hesitant to label themselves as politicians (Van Zoonen, 2005, p. 5). Instead, they try to find a balance between a life as a serious politician and as a unique individual (Ibid, p. 69). Top US politicians seem to have recognized that YouTube can be a way to access more people and showcase themselves as relevant and in touch with contemporary culture; both Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ihlan Omar of the Democratic Party have played Among Us, a popular whodunit-style video game, with several of the political YouTubers mentioned in this paper on a livestream. It might be a good idea for politicians to get friendly with those YouTubers, too: it was clear from my interviews that my informants had a great deal more trust towards the YouTubers they followed than actual politicians, showing the most distrust towards politicians and political YouTubers they disagreed with politically.

Uldam 2013: https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1755/920 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1024433199079759982/uldam2013.pdf

Coppock et al 2021 (all three authors are libertarians): libertarian op-eds changed individual's minds by ~.5-1 points on a 7-point scale (if linear, ~7-14%) about specific issues; about 2/3 of this effect persists after 1 month: https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-16112 https://sci-hub.st/10.1561/100.00016112 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/809165474083373116/coppock2018.pdf

Under the rosiest scenario, an op-ed costs $5,000 to produce, reaches 400,000 people, and changes the mind of 20% of them. Plugging these values into Equation (1), we obtain that the cost per mind changed is a mere 6 cents. Under a more conservative set of assumptions, an op-ed costs 10 times as much ($50,000), reaches half as many people (200,000), and changes half as many minds (10%). The resulting cost per mind changed would work out to $2.50.

^ supplementary material for above, including op-eds: https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/959332602148450345/coppock2018supp.pdf

Martin and Yurukoglu 2017: data from channel number randomization suggests that Fox News shifts voting patterns rightward: Without Fox News, .46% fewer people would've voted Republican in 2000, 3.59% in 2004, and 6.35% in 2008: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/8/16263710/fox-news-presidential-vote-study https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257%2Faer.20160812 http://sci-hub.st/10.1257/aer.20160812 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/786317526560276520/martin2017.pdf

more persuasive posts on /r/ChangeMyView tend to be shorter, earlier in the thread, from higher social capital (higher karma) users, and use more argumentative sentences: http://www.sdspeople.fudan.edu.cn/zywei/paper/487-wei-acl2016.pdf

Brien and Crandall 2005: students were not more likely to trust a high-status doctor than low-status nurse (n=51 white undergrad students), students were more likely to distrust someone perceived as self-interested and someone in the outgroup (n=130 undergrad students), and students were more likely to trust someone defending the status quo (n=92): https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11211-005-3368-4 https://sci-hub.st/10.1007/s11211-005-3368-4 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/941147162501324800/brien2005.pdf

Left Realism: crime hurts the poor the most: deprivation, despair -> crime; crime -> deprivation, despair: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left_realism

Overpoliced but Underprotected: too much policing of small crimes, too little crime prevention overall

https://mobile.twitter.com/samswey/status/1180655779180879872

https://www.joincampaignzero.org/research

https://8cantwait.org/

https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/09/the-counted-police-killings-us-vs-other-countries

wandering officers https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/4004/

meta-study on reducing recidivism: https://www.div12.org/violent-offender-treatment-effectiveness-what-we-know-and-where-to-from-here/ https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cpsp.12282 https://sci-hub.se/10.1111/cpsp.12282

possibly https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O8TjbeaKIb0

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/07/over-past-60-years-more-spending-police-hasnt-necessarily-meant-less-crime/

https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/actual-police-defunding/comments#comment-825177

https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2020/06/65309/

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2019/02/13/marshall-project-more-cops-dont-mean-less-crime-experts-say/2818056002/

Tella 2004: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282804322970733 https://sci-hub.se/10.1257/000282804322970733 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/812030234739212318/ditella2004.pdf

Ba 2021: https://science.sciencemag.org/content/371/6530/696 http://sci-hub.se/10.1126/science.abd8694

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/07/over-past-60-years-more-spending-police-hasnt-necessarily-meant-less-crime/

https://lawandcrime.com/george-floyd-death/kamala-harris-dismisses-notion-that-hiring-more-cops-results-in-safer-communities-heres-what-the-studies-say/

https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/police-and-crime-rates-in-canada.pdf

in 1997, the US had 242 police officers for every 100,000 residents; in 2016, 217: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2019/02/13/marshall-project-more-cops-dont-mean-less-crime-experts-say/2818056002/

bad meme about LAPD funding:

Los Angeles budget: 10.53 billion overall, 1.86 billion (17.7%) directly for police: http://cao.lacity.org/budget20-21/2020-21Budget_Summary.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/751266814842896416/2020-21Budget_Summary.pdf

graphical representation: 10.5 billion overall, ~3 billion for police in general: https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-08-11/defund-lapd-la-budget-spending-priorities https://archive.is/wsSiw

^ trend over time: upward: https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-08-11/defund-lapd-la-budget-spending-priorities https://archive.is/wsSiw

https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/16/camden-nj-police-reboot-is-being-misused-debate-over-police-reform/

Ba 2021: The role of officer race and gender in police-civilian interactions in Chicago: https://sci-hub.se/https://science.sciencemag.org/content/371/6530/696 http://sci-hub.se/10.1126/science.abd8694

PPI 2020: police in the USA kill Americans at much higher rates than other high-income countries: https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/06/05/policekillings/

Mapping Police Violence 2020: police killings (red) have no clear correlation with violent crime rates (blue): https://www.vox.com/2020/5/31/21276004/anger-police-killing-george-floyd-protests

Zivari 2020: homicides per capita and police killings per capita strongly correlate: https://kavehzivari.com/2020/06/02/violence-in-the-united-states/

More cops means less violent crime -- but at significant public expense, especially given the egregious underfunding of US welfare system. Re-allocation of cop time to *street presence* (or replaced/supplemented by community volunteers) may have similar effects.

https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2020/06/65309/

https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1370&context=jj_pubs

scrape https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/08/us/police-crime.html

In a recent survey of criminal justice experts, about two-thirds agreed that increasing police budgets would improve public safety. But many more of them 85 percent said that increasing spending on housing, health and education would do so. https://cjexpertpanel.org/surveys/policing-and-public-safety/

local example of crime defusing and labor opportunities fighting crime: https://www.thecity.nyc/2021/1/3/22211709/nypd-cops-brooklyn-brownsville-experiment-defund-police

Chalfin et al 2020: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20200792 https://www.nber.org/papers/w28202 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/790776020152221706/chalfin2020.pdf

Of course, reducing funding for police could allow increased funding for other alternatives. Indeed an array of high-quality research suggests that crime can, in certain contexts, be reduced through methods other than policing or its by-product, incarceration. Among the many alternatives to police for which there is promising evidence are placebased crime control strategies such as increasing the availability of trees and green space (Branas et al., 2011), restoring vacant lots (Branas et al., 2016, 2018; Moyer et al., 2019), public-private partnerships (Cook and MacDonald, 2011), street lighting (Doleac and Sanders, 2015; Chalfin et al., 2019), and reducing physical disorder (Sampson and Raudenbush, 2001; Keizer et al., 2008). There is also evidence that social service-based strategies such as summer jobs for disadvantaged youth (Heller, 2014; Gelber et al., 2016; Davis and Heller, 2017), cognitive behavioral therapy (Blattman et al., 2017; Heller et al., 2017), mental health treatment (Deza et al., 2020) and local non-profits more generally (Sharkey et al., 2017) can have important crime-reducing effects. While social service terventions are often difficult to scale (Mofiitt, 2006; Ludwig et al., 2011), the increasing number of studies which show that there are ways to reduce crime outside the deterrence channels of the traditional model of Becker (1968) is encouraging.

Chalfin et al 2020: https://twitter.com/MWillJr/status/1339971033697300483 https://www.nber.org/papers/w28202 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/790776020152221706/chalfin2020.pdf

While we find that investments in law enforcement save Black lives, the number of averted homicides (1 per 10-17 officers hired) is modest and might even be zero in cities with large Black populations. [....] While information on the use of force by police officers is not collected nationally, if we use the estimate in Weisburst (2019a) that 2.7 percent of arrests lead to an incident in which force was used by a police officer then hiring one additional police officer would yield between 3 and 6 use of force incidents per life saved through homicide abatement.

Levitt 1997: early studies were not causal, and police hiring and crime are likely endogenous -- biasing results toward a positive correlation between hiring and crime: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951346 http://www.piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Levitt1997.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/974839889281577030/levitt1997.pdf

Levitt 1997: instrumental variable: police are more likely to be hired during election years (quasi-random), and each 1% increase causes 1.98% less murder, 0.79% less robbery per person (logged): https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951346 http://www.piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Levitt1997.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/974839889281577030/levitt1997.pdf 1995 preprint: https://www.nber.org/papers/w4991

The mean percentage change in sworn police officers for the cities in the sample is 2.1 percent in gubernatorial election years, 2.0 percent in mayoral election years, and 0.0 percent in nonelection years. That relationship persists after controlling for a variety of demographic, socioeconomic, and economic factors.

McCrary 2002: the above paper has programming and classification errors, which Levitt 2002 admits, which underestimated variability in crime, and which thus result in the causal evidence of elections on pooled crime to shrink to insignificance for all crimes: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/00028280260344768 https://sci-hub.st/10.1257/00028280260344768 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/974839306952802314/mccrary2002.pdf

Levitt 2002: using a new instrument, municipal workers and firefighters, weaker but similar results as Levit 1997 are obtained: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/00028280260344777 https://sci-hub.st/10.1257/00028280260344777 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/974839299021373470/levitt2002.pdf

Klick 2005: differences in differences: causal evidence from changes in the Terror Alert Level (and changes in police presence in DC) suggest that higher officer presence reduces crime: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/2/13/18193661/hire-police-officers-crime-criminal-justice-reform-booker-harris https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/426877 https://sci-hub.se/10.1086/426877 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/751267870863917156/klick2005.pdf

This suggests the possibility of switching to a formula Tabarrok has summarized as more police, fewer prisons, less crime : uniformed officers patrolling the streets stopping crime before it starts rather than working in prisons surveilling convicts. https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2013/01/more-police-fewer-prisons-less-crime.html todo reread xxx

About a year ago, Stephen Mello of Princeton University assessed the Obama-era increase in federal police funding. Thanks to the stimulus bill, funding for Clinton s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) hiring grant program surged from about $20 million a year in the late-Bush era to $1 billion in 2009. The program design allowed Mello to assess some quasi-random variation in which cities got grants. The data shows that compared to cities that missed out, those that made the cut ended up with police staffing levels that were 3.2 percent higher and crime levels that were 3.5 percent lower. Mello 2018: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272718302305 http://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.12.003 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/751272248509333515/mello2019.pdf preprint: https://www.princeton.edu/~smello/papers/cops.pdf

Chalfin 2017: literature review: most studies with causal or quasi-causal methodology found that an increase in police significantly decreases violent and nonviolent crime; 2SLS instrumental variable: on average from 1960-2010, 1% more cops yields 0.67% less murder, 0.34% less violent crime, and 0.17% less property crime: https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00694 https://sci-hub.se/10.1162/REST_a_00694 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/751272535701717123/chalfin2017.pdf instrumental variable: either (Annual Survey of Government (ASG) number of sworn officers) on (Uniform Crime Survey (UCS) number of sworn officers), or vice versa

Chalfin 2017: 2SLS instrumental variable: on average from 1960-2010, every $1 spent on extra policing generated either $1.63 in social benefits: https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00694 https://sci-hub.se/10.1162/REST_a_00694 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/751272535701717123/chalfin2017.pdf

Chalfin 2017: 2SLS instrumental variable: when adding direct prison costs, the above drops to $1.31; but both estimates ignore indirect social benefits of policing, which strongly suggest that US cities are underpoliced: https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00694 https://sci-hub.se/10.1162/REST_a_00694 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/751272535701717123/chalfin2017.pdf

Zeoli 2010: correlational evidence suggests that intimate partner homicide is ~32% less per logged police officer per 1000 in 46 cities: https://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/16/2/90.full https://sci-hub.se/10.1136/ip.2009.024620 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/821830513673240607/zeoli2010.pdf

Chalfin et al 2020: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20200792 https://www.nber.org/papers/w28202 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/790776020152221706/chalfin2020.pdf

Since larger police forces lead to reductions in index crimes, the decline in index crime arrests that we observe suggests that larger police forces reduce serious crime primarily through deterrence rather than by arresting and incapacitating additional offenders.

It s important in that context to note a recent study by John MacDonald, Jeffrey Fagan, and Amanda Geller that looked at localized policing surges in New York City (dubbed Operation Impact by the NYPD) over a period of years. They found that surges led to both less crime and more stop and frisk -type incidents where officers stopped citizens (typically young black or Latino men) without probable cause. That suggests a sharp trade-off between crime reduction and civil rights. But the same study, by looking at the covariance of stop and frisks and crime reduction, found that the additional stops were doing nothing to reduce crime. All of the anti-crime impact, in other words, came from putting more cops on the beat rather than from the use of aggressive tactics. New York City, not coincidentally, has continued to enjoy low and falling crime rates since stop and frisk tactics were curtailed. What s helpful is more officers, not more harassment. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0157223 https://sci-hub.se/10.1371/journal.pone.0157223 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/751274851616030800/macdonald2016.PDF

Harcourt and Ludwig 2006: there is no direct evidence that aggressive policing of lower-level offenses deters or incapacitates more serious offenses: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4495553 https://sci-hub.se/10.2307/4495553 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/790778077667393556/harcourt2006.pdf

Our analysis provides no empirical evidence to support the view that shifting police towards minor disorder offenses would improve the efficiency of police spending and reduce violent crime.

The criminologist Lawrence Sherman has observed that the United States is very unusual in spending much more money on the prison system than on our police departments. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/nyregion/police-have-done-more-than-prisons-to-cut-crime-in-new-york.html?pagewanted=3&_r=0&smid=tw-share&pagewanted=all&login=email&auth=login-email

Chalfin et al 2020: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20200792 https://www.nber.org/papers/w28202 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/790776020152221706/chalfin2020.pdf

At the same time, our findings on low-level arrests highlight the potential benefits of changing the priorities of law enforcement. This could occur through changes in policy like the decriminalization of drug possession or via efforts to recruit a larger number of Black or female police officers (Donohue III and Levitt, 2001; McCrary, 2007; West, 2018; Miller and Segal, 2019; Harvey and Mattia, 2019; Ba and Rivera, 2020; Linos and Riesch, 2020). Moreover, there is growing evidence to support the efficacy of de-escalation training (Engel et al., 2020) and procedural justice training (Owens et al., 2018; Nagin and Telep, 2020; Wood et al., 2020), federal oversight of police agencies (Powell et al., 2017; Goh, 2020), and the use of and training in non-lethal weapons (MacDonald et al., 2009; Sousa et al., 2010). There is likewise support for the idea that reforms to police unions may be effective (Dharmapala et al., 2019) especially if unions can be incentivized to self-regulate, which could take the form of transferring the burden of liability insurance from municipalities to unions (Ramirez et al., 2018; Ba and Rivera, 2019). Finally, police officers tend to be highly responsive to managerial directives (Mummolo, 2018), which suggests that procedural reforms could meaningfully alter officer behavior even holding police force size fixed.

Asher and Horwitz 2020: proportion of time that officers spend responding to violent & nonviolent calls, proactive policing, traffic issues, medical & other issues: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/upshot/unrest-police-time-violent-crime.html

The key mechanism here is fatigue which while obviously not a substitute for curing systemic racism, is a lot easier to fix with concrete short-term steps. Tired officers, across a variety of studies, generate more complaints from the civilians they interact with. https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-police-officers-overworked-cops.html

A 2017 audit of the Kings County Sheriff s Department in Washington found that working a single hour of overtime led to a 2.7 percent increase in the odds that the officer would be involved in a use-of-force incident the following week. https://www.kingcounty.gov/~/media/depts/auditor/new-web-docs/2017/kcao-overtime-2017/kcao-overtime-2017.ashx?la=en

A 2015 study of police officers in Phoenix found that being assigned to a 13-hour rather than 10-hour shift led to increases in fatigue and Professional Standards Bureau complaints. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1098611115584910?journalCode=pqxa

A 2018 study found that working back-to-back night shifts increased the odds of public complaints, and that the effect is particularly large when the officers had to make court appearances in the daytime between the night shifts. https://academic.oup.com/sleep/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/sleep/zsy231/5195409?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Bose 2020: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3678500

Pew 2017: most crimes go unreported (including 55% of violent and 65% of property crime) and most reported crimes go unsolved (including 55% of violent and 80% of property crime): https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/01/most-violent-and-property-crimes-in-the-u-s-go-unsolved/

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/01/most-violent-and-property-crimes-in-the-u-s-go-unsolved/

baltimore https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-crime-policy-20191230-zk2v2auuhbgq3f7zsh3t7rt6cm-story.html

https://foxbaltimore.com/news/city-in-crisis/baltimore-police-departments-clearance-rate-now-426

https://www.latimes.com/opinion/bookclub/la-reading-los-angeles-kennedy-ghettoside-20150404-story.html

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-underpolicing-of-black-america-1422049080

Devi and Fryer 2020: https://www.nber.org/papers/w27324 https://sci-hub.se/10.3386/w27324 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/985382118538494034/devi2020.pdf

Campbell 2021: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3767097

A difference-in-differences design finds census places with protests experienced a 15% to 20% decrease in police homicides from 2014 through 2019, around 300 fewer deaths. This decrease was prominent when protests were large or frequent. Potential mechanisms behind the reduction include police agencies obtaining body-worn cameras to curtail force and depolicing following a so-called `Ferguson Effect.' Fewer property crimes, but more murders, were reported to agencies with local protests; in contrast, the property crime clearance rate fell.

rates over time: https://www.ebpsociety.org/blog/education/205-tough-crime-policies-have-struck-out It was found that in 1994, 51.8% of individuals released from prison in the United States were re-incarcerated within three years (Lagan & Levin, 2002). In more recent years, it was found that in 1999, 45.4% of individuals and in 2004, 43.3% of individuals were re-incarcerated within three years of their release (Pew Center on the States, 2011). https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/04/the-misleading-math-of-recidivism

rehabilitation reduces recidivism rates: www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Mastrobuoni_Terlizzese_bollate_oct14.pdf

rehabilitative programs reduce recidivism and increase employment: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR564.html

longer prison sentences increase recidivism by 3% (0.18% per month after 12.7 months), but there was no difference https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=2701549 http://madgic.library.carleton.ca/deposit/govt/ca_fed/publicsafety_prisonsentences_1999.pdf The essential conclusions reached from this study were: 1. Prisons should not be used with the expectation of reducing criminal behaviour. 2. On the basis of the present results, excessive use of incarceration has enormous cost implications. 3. In order to determine who is being adversely affected by prison, it is incumbent upon prison officials to implement repeated, comprehensive assessments of offenders attitudes, values, and behaviours while incarcerated. 4. The primary justification of prison should be to incapacitate offenders (particularly, those of a chronic, higher risk nature) for reasonable periods and to exact retribution.`

Kovandzic et al 2004: three strike laws have no causal decrease on index crime rates (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, auto theft): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07418820400095791 http://sci-hub.se/10.1080/07418820400095791 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/962426366970699846/kovandzic2004.pdf controls: Age, % poverty, income, % black, % Hispanic, % female, % living alone, prison population, prison population, last year crime

Caulkins 2001: three-strike laws are extremely expensive; even assuming that incarceration inherently reduces crime, three strike laws would cost about $12,000 per crime prevented: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1011098100458 https://sci-hub.se/10.1023/A:1011098100458 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/962426743988322355/caulkins2001.pdf

Falk 2013: in Sweden from 1973-2004, persistent violent offenders (3+ convictions) did the majority of violent crime [sexual violence excluded]: 0.12% of the population received 19.8% of the violent crime convictions (1/10 do 20), 1.02% received 63.2% (1 do 63), and 3.91% received all 100% (4 do 100); compared with sex- and age-matched non-offenders, violent offenders were significantly more likely to have personality and mental disorders, violent convictions before 19 and , and nonviolent criminality: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00127-013-0783-y https://sci-hub.se/10.1007/s00127-013-0783-y https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/865143068180217866/falk2013.pdf

Falk 2013: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00127-013-0783-y https://sci-hub.se/10.1007/s00127-013-0783-y https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/865143068180217866/falk2013.pdf

The distribution of convictions was highly skewed; 24,342 persistent violent offenders (1.0 % of the total population) accounted for 63.2 % of all convictions. Persistence in violence was associated with male sex (OR 2.5), personality disorder (OR 2.3), violent crime conviction before age 19 (OR 2.0), drug-related offenses (OR 1.9), nonviolent criminality (OR 1.9), substance use disorder (OR 1.9), and major mental disorder (OR 1.3). [....] Among individuals convicted of one violent crime, 44% (41,257 of 93,642) were reconvicted. After 2 violent convictions, 59% (24,342 of 41,257) were reconvicted, and after 3 convictions, 68% (16,435 of 24,342) were reconvicted. If violent careers could be stopped after 3 convictions, 53% of all violent convictions would be prevented. The recurrence rate increased from about 70% after 4 convictions to about 80% after 7 and to about 90% after 11 crimes per individual, after which the low number of perpetrators at each new step made further analyses difficult to interpret.

Falk 2013: as a result, reducing recidivism rates would enormously reduce violent crime: if every persister had done just 1 violent crime, 78% of violent crimes would have been avoided: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00127-013-0783-y https://sci-hub.se/10.1007/s00127-013-0783-y https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/865143068180217866/falk2013.pdf

juvenile incarceration decreases schooling and increases re-incarceration later in life: https://news.mit.edu/2015/juvenile-incarceration-less-schooling-more-crime-0610 https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/130/2/759/2330376

juvenile incarceration is very expensive: https://www.aecf.org/resources/no-place-for-kids-full-report/ https://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-NoPlaceForKidsFullReport-2011.pdf Multisystemic Therapy (MST) and Functional Family Therapy (FFT) are intensive family treatment models for delinquent youth. In MST, therapists lead a regimented three- to five-month family intervention process involving multiple contacts each week in the family s home and surrounding community. FFT employs office-based counseling (an average of 12 sessions) designed first to engage family members and then to support meaningful behavior changes that improve family interaction and address the underlying causes of delinquent behavior. Costs average $6,000 to $9,500 per youth for MST and $3,000 to $3,500 for FFT, whereas **a typical stay in a juvenile corrections facility (9 to 12 months at $241 per day) costs $66,000 to $88,000.**

legalizing marijuana has cut violent crime: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12521/full

legalizing marijuana reduces opioid deaths: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/1898878

legalizing marijuana reduces opioid abuse: https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2016.303426

needle programs work: https://www.health.ny.gov/diseases/aids/providers/reports/docs/sep_report.pdf https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2014/12/report-documents-success-of-state-needle-exchange-program-017909 Intravenous drug users were among the most at-risk populations for contracting AIDS in the earliest years of the epidemic. In 1992, 52 percent of newly diagnosed AIDS cases in New York were among I.V. drug users. By 2012, intravenous drug users accounted for only 3 percent of new H.I.V. diagnoses.

the illegal drug market causes violent crime and cannot be solved by increased law enforcement: http://www.ijdp.org/article/S0955-3959(11)00022-3/fulltext The present systematic review demonstrates that drug law enforcement interventions are unlikely to reduce drug market violence. Instead, and contrary to the conventional wisdom that increasing drug law enforcement will reduce violence, the existing scientific evidence base suggests that drug prohibition likely contributes to drug market violence and increased homicide rates and that increasingly sophisticated methods of disrupting illicit drug distribution networks may in turn increase levels of violence.

after colorado legalized marijuana in 2014, marijuana use increased among 18+ (from ~30% to ~32%) and decreased among 12-17 (from ~10% to ~8%): https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2019/mar/25/john-hickenlooper/did-spike-marijuana-use-colorado-after-legal/ https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHsaePercents2016/NSDUHsaePercents2016.pdf https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHsaeMethodology2016/NSDUHsaeMethodology2016.pdf sample size 5207 for 2015-16, in-person interviews based on Census-weighted population data

monthly drug use has declined among adults and teens: https://transformdrugs.org/the-success-of-portugals-decriminalisation-policy-in-seven-charts/ http://archive.ph/xEg3m

drug deaths have declined: https://transformdrugs.org/the-success-of-portugals-decriminalisation-policy-in-seven-charts/ http://archive.ph/xEg3m

HIV and AIDS transmission among drug users has declined almost 100 times: https://transformdrugs.org/the-success-of-portugals-decriminalisation-policy-in-seven-charts/ http://archive.ph/xEg3m

decriminalization is not expensive; drug policy costs just 0.05% of Portugal's GDP: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/4508/TD0116918ENN.pdf while in Europe, on average, just incarceration for drug offenses cost 0.05 % of GDP or EUR 5.9 billion http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_228272_EN_TDAT14001ENN.pdf

decriminalization reduced the number of people charged with drug possession and therefore reduced the pressure of drugs on the criminal justice system: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/13325/1/BFDPP_BP_14_EffectsOfDecriminalisation_EN.pdf.pdf

in 2019, 66% of Americans said "marijuana should be made legal": https://news.gallup.com/poll/243908/two-three-americans-support-legalizing-marijuana.aspx

study about Ireland: https://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/6868/1/McElrath_4051_Drug_use_and_drug_markets.pdf

data about Ireland: https://www.health-ni.gov.uk/publications/statistics-northern-ireland-drug-misuse-database-200102-201516

not clear that drug prices are rising: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-drugs/more-blood-but-no-victory-as-philippine-drug-war-marks-its-first-year-idUSKBN19G05D In July 2016, a gram of shabu cost 1,200-11,000 pesos ($24-$220), according to agency s figures. Last month, a gram cost 1,000-15,000 pesos ($20-$300), it said.

in Philippines, 2% of population uses meth: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illegal_drug_trade_in_the_Philippines

118,000 "drug personalities" have been arrested: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/senator-rodrigo-duterte-drug-war-killed-20000-180221134139202.html

wikipedia article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_Drug_War

the death penalty in Washington state costs 1.43x more than comparable life without parole: https://ballotpedia.org/Fact_check/Is_the_death_penalty_more_expensive_than_life_in_prison https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/documents/WashingtonCosts.pdf

the vast majority of criminologists hold that the death penalty does not reduce crime: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20685045 https://sci-hub.se/10.2307/20685045 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/750920918104145960/radelet2009.pdf

To shed light on this dispute, we drew up a list in mid-2008 of every living person who (1) was a Fellow in the American Society of Criminology (ASC),69 (2) had won the ASC's Sutherland Award, the highest award given by that organization for contributions to criminological theory,70 or (3) was a president of the ASC between 1997 and the present. The American Society of Criminology was founded in 1941 and is the world's largest organization of academic criminologists, boasting a membership in 2008 of 3,500 criminologists from fifty countries.71

among 1088 released homicide offenders after a followup period of mean 10.3 years, 60% were re-arrested for any crime, 21% for a serious offence (robbery, assault, sxual assault, abduction, extortion, burglary, arson, child pornography), and 0.28% were re-arrested for murder: http://regnet.anu.edu.au/news-events/news/6874/how-likely-it-murderers-will-re-offend https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0004865817722393 http://sci-hub.se/10.1177/0004865817722393 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/750924330137026620/broadhurst2017.pdf

1.6% of death row inmates have been exonerated and at least 4.1% are expected to be exonerated: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/many-prisoners-on-death-row-are-wrongfully-convicted/ https://www.pnas.org/content/111/20/7230 http://sci-hub.se/10.1073/pnas.1306417111 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/750929003572887645/gross2014.pdf

life sentencing provides closure while death penalty does not: among 46 close family members of a homicide victim, those in Texas (where the homicidal agent was sentenced to death) and Minnesota (to life imprisonment), Minnesotans had higher satisfaction, were less likely to still be involved in prosecution, and more likely to have post-prosecution growth: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/death-penalty-bring-closure-victims-family https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=5144&context=mulr

only 1 in 5 rapes are committed by strangers: https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/sexual-assault-victims/

only 1 in 4 sexual assaults are committed by strangers: https://www.rainn.org/statistics/perpetrators-sexual-violence

police steal more than burglars do: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/23/cops-took-more-stuff-from-people-than-burglars-did-last-year/

police officers are about 3-4x more likely to violently abuse their spouses: http://womenandpolicing.com/violenceFS.asp https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED338997.pdf In a 1988 Arizona study of 553 police officers and their spouses, 41% of male officers and 34% of female officers reported violent assaults in their marital relationships compared with 16% of civilians. Over one-third of wives of police officers (37%) reported violence in their marriage. (Neidig, Russell, and Seng, unpublished). A 1981 survey of Toronto police officers found a divorce and separation rate of 63%, almost double the national average among Canadians at the time. Recent studies indicate that as many as 75% of police marriages in large metropolitan areas are likely to end in divorce. (Came, et al., 1989). [....] A 1986 review suggested that as many as 30% of all police officers abuse alcohol, compared with less than 10% of the population at large. (Hepp, 1987)

police officers and military are about 3x more likely to abuse their spouses: http://womenandpolicing.com/violenceFS.asp https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/polic15&div=12&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals

literally every kind of inequality is getting worse (wealth, income, consumption): https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018001pap.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/727611018758455357/fisher18.pdf

the US has the greatest wealth inequality: http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=SDD/DOC(2018)1&docLanguage=En

the US has much more wealth inequality than income inequality: http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=SDD/DOC(2018)1&docLanguage=En

in 2018, the top 0.8% held 44.8% of all wealth: https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2018/12/04/the-top-1-own-48-of-all-global-personal-wealth-10-own-85/

^ scrollbar-based representation of global wealth inequality: https://mkorostoff.github.io/1-pixel-wealth/

^ graphical representation of global wealth inequality: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/visualizing-the-extreme-concentration-of-global-wealth/

the top 1% owns 56% of all equities (stock and ownership stakes), while the bottom 90% own just 12%: https://www.ft.com/content/2501e154-4789-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441

Three decades ago, ownership was also lopsided, but the top percentage point of Americans by wealth only controlled 46 per cent of all US equities held by households. By the end of September 2019, that proportion had hit a record 56 per cent, amounting to $21.4tn, according to the investment bank s calculations. That includes both public stock and ownership stakes in private companies.

america is less mobile than the UK or any Scandinavian country: http://ftp.iza.org/dp1938.pdf

relative movement of income across generations: https://www.bostonfed.org/inequality2014/papers/reeves-sawhill.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/879081943373848646/reeves-sawhill-2021.pdf

absolute movement of income across generations: https://www.bostonfed.org/inequality2014/papers/reeves-sawhill.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/879081943373848646/reeves-sawhill-2021.pdf

on average, it would take 5 generations to move from the bottom 10% to the median 50% of incomes in the USA: http://www.oecd.org/social/broken-elevator-how-to-promote-social-mobility-9789264301085-en.htm

income mobility is dead: you've got a 50/50 chance of earning more at 30 than your parents did at 30: http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/assets/documents/abs_mobility_summary.pdf

those with higher incomes have seen faster income growth than those with lower incomes: http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/PSZ2017.pdf https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/8/16112368/piketty-saez-zucman-income-growth-inequality-stagnation-chart

Reeves and Sawhill 2014: those disadvantaged in early stages of life are much more likely to be disdvantaged at later stages of life: https://www.bostonfed.org/inequality2014/papers/reeves-sawhill.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/879081943373848646/reeves-sawhill-2021.pdf

poverty literally stunts brain growth -- there are significant impacts for family income below 50,000 or so: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-inequality-does-to-the-brain/ https://issuu.com/1magazine18/docs/9sdcsdc https://www.nature.com/articles/nn.3983

poverty during childhood harms the growth of the brain, reduces academic performance, and reduces intellectual performance: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapediatrics/fullarticle/2381542

higher parental income increases a student's college graduation rate by 1.8-5.3 times: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/upshot/for-the-poor-the-graduation-gap-is-even-wider-than-the-enrollment-gap.html http://archive.is/38kns

income and education between generations have a strong relationship: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/rich-kids-stay-rich-poor-kids-stay-poor/

^ the causal pathways for this are not yet fully understood: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnins.2014.00276/full

academic performance differences between the rich and the poor have increased, not decreased: https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/reardon%20whither%20opportunity%20-%20chapter%205.pdf

higher income inequality is associated with reduced mobility: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.27.3.79

CEO compensation vs worker compensation has increased from 20x higher to 200x higher -- are CEOs 10x more productive today than they were in 1960? https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/130354.pdf

luck very probably has a significant role in financial and scientific success: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.07068.pdf

the poor don't spend more on entertainment; instead, they spend more on food and healthcare: https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/being-rich-means-having-money-to-spend-on-being-richer/389871/

the poor do not spend frivolously: https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/03/household-expenditures-and-income

the poor spend very little on luxury spending (here defined as "goods whose consumption increases as income increases") https://www.db.com/newsroom_news/Inequality_Jan2018.pdf

the rise of superstar incomes is mostly due to the rise of financial/manager incomes: https://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/BakijaColeHeimJobsIncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/779160420212408320/bakija2012preprint.pdf

Our findings suggest that **the incomes of executives, managers, supervisors, and financial professionals can account for 60 percent of the increase in the share of national income going to the top percentile of the income distribution** between 1979 and 2005.

The incomes of executives, managers, financial professionals, and technology professionals who are in the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution are found to be very sensitive to stock market fluctuations. **Most of our evidence points towards a particularly important role for financial market asset prices, shifting of income between the corporate and personal tax bases, and possibly corporate governance and entrepreneurship, in explaining the dramatic rise in top income shares.**

divergence of very-top incomes: relative shift towards financial and manager incomes, not "worker" incomes: https://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/BakijaColeHeimJobsIncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/779160420212408320/bakija2012preprint.pdf

[E]ven within the top one percent of income earners, there has been a large amount of divergence in the incomes of people within the same profession. This point is highlighted in Table 11, which reports the ratio of the annual real growth rate among people in each profession in the top 0.1 percent of the national income distribution to the growth rate for taxpayers in the same profession in the 99th to 99.5th percentile range, again holding the occupational composition of the top quantiles constant. Most notably, the real income growth rate for non-financial executives in the top 0.1 percent was 7 times as large as for non-financial executives in the 99th to 99.5th percentile range.

the top 0.1% has seen their income increase mostly due to an increase in salary income, not capital gains income (which is similar) or interest income (which declined): https://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/BakijaColeHeimJobsIncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/779160420212408320/bakija2012preprint.pdf

As a result, salary income and business income account for about 63 percent of the increase in the share of national income (including capital gains) going to the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution between 1971-1980 and 2001-2010, so theories to explain the rising top income shares shown in Figure 1 must largely be about compensation for labor. Among taxpayers who were in the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution ranked by income including capital gains, salary income and business income accounted for 34 percent of income including capital gains, on average 1971-1980, and 56 percent of income including capital gains, on average 2001- 2010. The total share of national income including capital gains going to the top 0.1 percent increased from an average of 2.9 percent during 1971-1980 to an average of 9.6 percent during 2001-2010. The 63 percent figure noted in the text is (0.56*9.6 0.4*2.9) / (9.6 - 2.9). Capital gains accounted for 34 percent of the incomes of people in the top 0.1 percent on average 1971-1980, and 30 percent 2001-2010. Other capital income such as dividends and interest declined from 26 percent of income to 14 percent of income for the top 0.1 percent of income earners over this period.

Jorda 2019: https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/134/3/1225/5435538 https://sci-hub.se/10.1093/qje/qjz012 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/806957908096057394/jorda2019.pdf

Using a measure of portfolio returns to compute r minus g in Piketty s notation, we uncover an important finding. Even calculated from more granular asset price returns data, the same fact reported in Piketty (2014) holds true for more countries, more years, and more dramatically: namely r >> g. [....] Benhabib and Bisin (2016) show that in a wide class of models featuring stochastic returns to wealth, a higher gap between r and g increases the Pareto index of the steady-state wealth distribution, making it more unequal. [....] Our research speaks directly to the relationship between r, the rate of return on wealth, and g, the growth rate of the economy, that figures prominently in the current debate on inequality. One robust finding in this paper is that r >> g: globally, and across most countries, the weighted rate of return on capital was twice as high as the growth rate in the past 150 years.

Barkai 2020: pure profit share increase: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jofi.12909 https://sci-hub.se/10.1111/jofi.12909 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/806957906113069057/barkai2020.pdf

Reeves and Sawhill 2014: a few interventions in early life stages result in large cumulative benefits: https://www.bostonfed.org/inequality2014/papers/reeves-sawhill.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/879081943373848646/reeves-sawhill-2021.pdf

more-equal societies have higher intergererational income mobility: https://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/medios/44582910.pdf

income inequality can be solved by progressive economic policies: https://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-summary-english.pdf https://www.vox.com/2018/7/29/17627134/income-inequality-chart

higher unemployment benefits and higher tax progressivity decrease intergenerational income inequality: https://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/medios/44582910.pdf

intergenerational immobility of education can be decreased by larger teacher payscales, higher unemployment replacement rate, higher tax progressivity, higher enrollment in preschoool, less tracking (ie, less nonuniform education), and lower enrollment in vocational school: https://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/medios/44582910.pdf

education reduces inequality: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/joes.12056 The conditional MRA predictions reported in Table 3 suggest that education has had no effect on average levels of inequality when measured by the Gini coefficient. However, the MRA also indicates that education has led to a compression in incomes: it has resulted in reduced income inequality at both ends of the income distribution. The results also suggest that compared to primary schooling, secondary schooling and educational attainment are more effective at reducing inequality.

increased public education spending is associated with increased educational mobility (difference between years of schooling of child and parent): http://www.oecd.org/social/broken-elevator-how-to-promote-social-mobility-9789264301085-en.htm

increased health employment is associated with increased health mobility (difference between self-reported health of child and parent): http://www.oecd.org/social/broken-elevator-how-to-promote-social-mobility-9789264301085-en.htm

decreased middle class residents falling into poverty is associated with increased active labor market policy (programs to help residents find work) spending: http://www.oecd.org/social/broken-elevator-how-to-promote-social-mobility-9789264301085-en.htm

Neves Afonso Silva 2016: meta-analysis: inequality has a medium negative effect on growth, and that wealth inequality has a stronger effect -- a 10% increase in inequality correlates with a 3% decrease in growth -- though this effect is larger in developing than developed nations: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X15002600 https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.038 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1013264110114312242/neves2016.pdf

After correcting for these two forms of publication bias, we investigated the sources of heterogeneity by means of a metaregression. As in Dominicis et al. s (2008) our results suggest that for a 5% level of significance: the effect of inequality on growth is negative and more pronounced in less developed countries than in rich countries; the inclusion of regional dummies in the growth regression of the primary studies considerably weakens such effect; expenditure and gross income inequality tend to lead to different estimates of the effect size. However, contrary to it Dominicis et al. (2008), we find that: the impact of inequality on growth is not significantly influenced by the quality of the data on income distribution or by the use of different panel estimation techniques; crosssection studies systematically report a stronger negative impact than panel data studies. Furthermore, our results suggest that wealth inequality is more pernicious to subsequent growth than income inequality is. With the exception of the impact of using expenditure versus gross income, all these results are robust.

Dominicis Florax de Groot 2008: meta-analysis finds that inequality has a weak negative effect on growth: https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/growth-and-inequality-a-meta-analysis https://sci-hub.se/10.1111/j.1467-9485.2008.00470.x https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/1013264388322496542/dedominicis2008.pdf

The use of fixed-effects estimators or the inclusion of regional-specific dummies in the regressions has a similar effect of reducing the negative impact of inequality on growth in the cross-section estimates, and of accentuating the positive effect in studies based on pooled data. In accordance with Barro (2000), we found that the correlation between growth and income inequality is different in rich as compared to poor countries. The negative impact of an uneven distribution of income is higher in less developed countries.

The longer the length of the growth period (ie, from 5 to 10 to 20 years), the lower the coefficient estimates of the correlation between income and economic growth [become]. This result supports the assertion that the mechanism at the basis of the relationship between inequality and growth works differently in the short run as compared to the long run. We also found that the quality of data on income inequality and economic growth is weaker, regardless whether the correlation is estimated to be positive or negative.

Cingano 2014: income inequality hurts economic growth: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/trends-in-income-inequality-and-its-impact-on-economic-growth_5jxrjncwxv6j-en http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/trends-in-income-inequality-and-its-impact-on-economic-growth-SEM-WP163.pdf

Dabla-Norris 2015: income increases for the bottom 60% are associated with increased GDP, while increases for the top 20% are associated with decreased GDP: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2016/12/31/Causes-and-Consequences-of-Income-Inequality-A-Global-Perspective-42986 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/729362995523616768/dablanorris15.pdf

More importantly, we find an inverse relationship between the income share accruing to the rich (top 20 percent) and economic growth. If the income share of the top 20 percent increases by 1 percentage point, GDP growth is actually 0.08 percentage point lower in the following five years, suggesting that the benefits do not trickle down. Instead, a similar increase in the income share of the bottom 20 percent (the poor) is associated with 0.38 percentage point higher growth. This positive relationship between disposable income shares and higher growth continues to hold for the second and third quintiles (the middle class). This result survives a variety of robustness checks, and is in line with recent findings for a smaller sample of advanced economies (OECD 2014).

Martin 2001: income inequality explains most of the homicide differences between Canadian provinces, between US states, and between Canada and the US: https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2003-99209-003 Comparison across the Canadian provinces provides a test case in which average income and the Gini are, instead, positively correlated, and we find that the positive relationship between the Gini and the homicide rate is undiminished. Temporal change in the Gini is also shown to be a significant predictor of temporal change in provincial homicide rates. When Canadian provinces and U.S. states are considered together, local levels of income inequality appear to be sufficient to account for the two countries' radically different national homicide rates.

Metz 2016: income inequality within and between neighborhoods strongly predicts property crime; 1% higher poverty in a housing block -> 0.5% higher property crime; 1% higher income difference with poorest neighboring neighboring block -> 0.25% higher property crime: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0042098016643914 https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/0042098016643914 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/862869420418007051/metz2016.pdf

The average total impact of a 1% increase in the percentage of households under the poverty line is estimated to have a 0.48% increase in the block group property crime rate. The average total impact of a 1% increase in the percentage of high income households is estimated to have a 0.81% decrease in the block group property crime rate. The average total impact of a 1% increase in the income difference from the poorest neighbouring block group is estimated to have a 0.25% increase in the block group property crime rate.

higher income inequality significantly predicts higher homicide and lower trust: https://academic.oup.com/eurpub/article/21/2/241/498070 The association between income inequality and homicide (Path c) was statistically significant; each SD increase in income inequality corresponded to 0.82 SD increase in homicide. Associations between income inequality and trust, and between trust and homicide, were also significant. Each SD increase in income inequality corresponded to a 0.65 SD decrease in trust, and each SD increase in trust corresponded to a 0.58 SD decrease in homicide.

higher wealth inequality correlates with lower home ownership: http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=SDD/DOC(2018)1&docLanguage=En

Kahneman 2010: money buys diminishing happiness: people with higher incomes are happier, but the returns from income decrease as income increases: http://www.pnas.org/content/107/38/16489 http://sci-hub.se/10.1073/pnas.1011492107 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/801686917766840361/kahneman2010.pdf

Killingsworth 2021: increased income correlates with increased happiness with diminishing returns (each doubling of income only increases happiness linearly; example: happiness gain from $30k/yr to $60k/yr is same as from $240k/yr to $480k/yr) and with no inflection point (there is no point at which happiness gains drop off): https://www.pnas.org/content/118/4/e2016976118 http://sci-hub.se/10.1073/pnas.2016976118 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/801686919540375582/killingsworth2020.pdf

higher social class is associated with greed: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuqGrz-Y_Lc https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/why-those-who-feel-they-have-less-give-more http://www.pnas.org/content/109/11/4086.full

in 1965, if wealth had been equally distributed between countries, 14,060,000 deaths (22.7% of 62,000,000 deaths total) could have been avoided: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002234337601300405 http://sci-hub.se/10.1177/002234337601300405

~60% of private wealth in the USA and ~55% of private wealth in Europe is inherited: http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/AlvaredoGarbintiPiketty2015.pdf

very few old people in the USA have over 1 million dollars: https://www.nber.org/chapters/c12429 https://www.nber.org/papers/w17824.pdf

poor people don't survive to become seniors: http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/05/poor-people-often-dont-survive-to-become-seniors-who-vote.html unformatted

between 1980 and 2008, less than 2.5% of deaths were subject to the estate tax: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Estate_Tax_Returns_as_a_Percentage_of_Adult_Deaths,_1982_-_2010.gif

in the USA, higher-income and higher-wealth people are more likely to inherit wealth, and more likely to inherit more wealth, than lower-income people: https://www.nber.org/papers/w16840 https://www.nber.org/papers/w16840.pdf

We also found, somewhat surprisingly, that inheritances and other wealth transfers tend to be equalizing in terms of the distribution of household wealth. Indeed, the addition of wealth transfers to other sources of household wealth has had a sizeable effect on reducing the inequality of wealth.

in the UK, higher-income people are more likely to inherit wealth, and more likely to inherit more wealth, than lower-income people: https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/bns/bn192.pdf

inheritance accounts for 50-60% of the effect of parental wealth on child wealth: http://ftp.iza.org/dp10126.pdf The results suggest that bequests are an important source of an individual s wealth status. Regressing child wealth rank on inheritance rank (columns 1 and 4) show high and statistically significant correlations between 0.32 and 0.38. Turning to the baseline generational equation (columns 2 and 5), parental wealth correlations are around the same levels as seen before, between 0.26 and 0.31. When adding ranked inheritance to the baseline model (columns 3 and 6), parental wealth correlations drop to 0.12 and 0.14, which represents a drop of between 50 and 60 per cent. This is a remarkably large reduction, suggesting that inherited wealth accounts for the majority of the measured intergenerational wealth correlation.

direct transfers probably account for most of the environmental correlation between parent and child wealth: https://www.nber.org/papers/w21409.pdf Column 6 of Table 5 presents the estimates when we control for all these possible mechanisms together. All together, we can explain almost 50% of the effect of the biological parent s wealth effect on children s wealth, while we are able to explain only a bit more than 20% of the adoptive parent s wealth effect. 47 Given that most of the environmental effect remains unexplained by earnings, savings rates, and investment returns, direct financial transfers from parents to children are a likely explanation for much of the environmental effect. 48 However, we do not have data on financial transfers that would allow us to study this directly.

inheritances are squandered: https://www.nber.org/papers/w12569.pdf The estimated coefficient on the latter is 0.79 with a standard error of 0.03. This suggests that wealth increases by only $0.79 for every dollar in inheritance received. Alternatively stated, individuals consume 21 percent of the inheritance received. With an adjusted R squared of 0.53, inheritances seem to explain quite a bit of the observed change in wealth.

large inheritances reduce laborforce participation (the rich clock out): https://www.nber.org/papers/w12569.pdf When the observations are weighted, the estimated effects of inheritances change little as shown in column (3). The estimated coefficient on inheritances becomes -2.66 (se=0.85), with an estimated marginal effect of -0.035 (se=0.018).14 An inheritance of $1 million, other things equal, reduces labor force participation by about 11 percent.

just 11% of wealth rank can be explained by genetics: https://www.nber.org/papers/w21409 Using the simplest behavioral genetics model the ACE model (Cesarini et al., 2010; Cronqvist and Siegel, 2015) the proportion of the variance due to shared environment equals the first correlation and the proportion of the variance due to genetics equals twice the difference between the second correlation and the first. **We find that, for net wealth, the first correlation is 0.288 (0.047) and the second correlation is 0.343 (0.001) implying that the shared environmental component accounts for 29% and the genetic component for 11% of the variance of the rank of net wealth of children.** This finding is consistent with our main results using regression analysis.

among millionaires, lesser (self-reported) unearned sources of wealth is associated with greater happiness from greater (self-reported) net worth: https://www.psypost.org/2018/02/large-amount-wealth-linked-increased-happiness-especially-among-earned-50767 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0146167217744766

the staircase model requires people to obtain increasing levels of treatment and social integration (eg, get clean, get a job) before getting full-time housing: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/how-finland-solved-homelessness/

The United States achieved substantial success in nearly halving homelessness among veterans by attaining the same sort of political consensus and providing resources for example, greatly expanding a scattered-site supported housing program for veterans called the HUD-VASH program2 . Without Finland s social benefit programs, the United States would need to rely more heavily on an expansion of housing subsidies, particularly the Housing Choice Voucher program. HUD-U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) Program

^Rosenheck 2003: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/207801 http://sci-hub.se/10.1001/archpsyc.60.9.940 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/801938783758974996/rosenheck2003.pdf

^ Montgomery 2013: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jcop.21554 https://sci-hub.se/10.1002/jcop.21554 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/801958791222525972/montgomery2013.pdf

^ Evans 2019: https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2019.305231 https://sci-hub.se/10.2105/AJPH.2019.305231 Results. For each additional voucher, permanent supportive housing units increased by 0.9 and the number of homeless veterans decreased by 1.

^ Byrne 2014: https://www.va.gov/HOMELESS/Estimating_Cost_Savings_Associated_With_HUD_VASH_Placement.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/801938984728002640/byrne2014.pdf

^ Tsai 2014: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0306460313000415 https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.addbeh.2013.02.002 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/801939647650856960/tsai2014.pdf

^ Cusack 2017: https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fser0000110 https://sci-hub.se/10.1037/ser0000110

In its greater reliance on congregate as well as scattered-site housing models, the Finnish approach to Housing First differs from the evidence-based programs pioneered by Pathways to Housing in New York City (Tsemberis, Gulcur, and Nakae, 2004) and again proven successful for people with serious mental illnesses in the five-city Canadian At Home/Chez Soi experiment (Aubry et al., 2016; Stergiopoulos et al., 2015).

houston program: https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/2d521d2c/files/uploaded/1617_Action_Plan_Final_Digital_082216.pdf

houston program: https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/2d521d2c/files/uploaded/Final_2018_PIT_FactSheet_Digital_3.pdf

houston program: https://www.texastribune.org/2019/07/02/why-homelessness-going-down-houston-dallas/

Shinn 2020: in Finland between 1987 and 2017, one-night estimates of homelessness as the US defines it (long-term homelessness) declined from ~11000 (of 4.9 million, ~0.22%, 1 in 445) to ~500 (of 5.5 million, ~0.009%, 1 in 10,000); all types of homelessness declined from ~18,000 (~0.37%, 1 in 272) to ~7000 (0.12%, 1 in 786): https://www.jstor.org/stable/26926894 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/801931444779614268/shinn2020.pdf

Shinn 2020: the staircase model halved homelessness in Finland but stalled in the 1990s: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26926894 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/801931444779614268/shinn2020.pdf

Using the staircase approach, Finland more than halved homelessness by 1994, but then progress slowed, as shown in exhibit 1. In particular, between 2004 and 2008, the number of single homeless individuals hovered between 7,400 and 7,960. Finland s annual homeless reports attributed the stalled progress to a group of people with high support needs who were experiencing long-term homelessness, analogous to chronic homelessness in the United States (Pleace, 2017). Researchers suggested that the staircase approach can work well with those who have opted for substance abuse rehabilitation and can cope with shared housing. However, the insistence on service users being intoxicant-free and able to take control of their lives has proven to be an insuperable barrier for many homeless people with multiple problems (Tainio and Fredriksson, 2009: 188).

Henley 2017: the Y-Foundation is a construction firm and a major landlord: https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/jun/03/its-a-miracle-helsinkis-radical-solution-to-homelessness We own much of the land, we have a zoning monopoly, we run our own construction company, says Riikka Karjalainen, senior planning officer. That helped a lot with Housing First because simply, there is no way you will eradicate homelessness without a serious, big-picture housing policy.

Shinn 2020: starting in 2008, the "Housing First" model converted and purchased thousands of units of housing: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26926894 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/801931444779614268/shinn2020.pdf

A Housing First approach requires housing, and Finland set about converting shelters into apartment units and buying and constructing housing for Housing First. In 1985, Helsinki had 2,121 shelter and hostel beds, and by 2016, the number had shrunk to 52. Meanwhile, supported housing units in Helsinki grew from 127 to 1,309, and independent rental apartments for (formerly) homeless people increased from 65 to 2,433 (Y-Foundation, 2017: 30). The Y-Foundation is currently the fourth largest landlord in Finland.

Henley 2017: https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/jun/03/its-a-miracle-helsinkis-radical-solution-to-homelessness

In each new district, the city maintains a strict housing mix to limit social segregation: 25% social housing, 30% subsidised purchase, and 45% private sector. Helsinki also insists on no visible external differences between private and public housing stock, and sets no maximum income ceiling on its social housing tenants.

Shinn 2020: residents often performed highly visible social work: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26926894 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/801931444779614268/shinn2020.pdf

Because programs that house a group of clients in the same building can encounter more community resistance than scattered-site apartments, the Finns have developed elaborate strategies to combat opposition from neighbors. Tenants engage in neighborhood work, such as collecting litter or maintaining parks. In one neighborhood, residents donned safety vests and kept watch over a bus stop used by schoolchildren. Neighbors have access to a 24-hour hotline to report any problems (Y-Foundation, 2017).

urban: https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/dismantling-harmful-false-narrative-homelessness-choice

Stark testimony 1984: 94% of Pheonix homeless reported wanting to leave the streets, suggesting 4-9% were there voluntarily: https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011335704 https://books.google.com/books?id=PS8gAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA597 pps 591-615 (n=150 in 1982, 91% wanted off; 195 in 1983, 96% wanted off; n_total = 345)

^ Stark 1982 publication: https://www.homelesshub.ca/resource/homeless-phoenix-profile

^ Stark 1983 publication: p570-591

Caulk report 1983: 78% of Portland homeless reported wanting to leave the streets, suggesting 22% were there voluntarily: https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011335704 https://books.google.com/books?id=PS8gAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA1037 pps 1001-1051 (n=125) "Do you want to get off the streets or out of your current situation?" (from p1049)

57-63% of among Pheonix homeless would be considered unable to work (of whom, about 1/3 are severely mentally disabled, 1/3 chronic substance abuse, 1/6 physically handicapped, 1/12 socially maladjusted, and 1/12 over 65 years): https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011335704 https://books.google.com/books?id=PS8gAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA597 (n=150 in 1982, 195 in 1983)

46% of Portland homeless reported having military experience: https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011335704 https://books.google.com/books?id=PS8gAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA1031 (n=133 in 1983)

california's housing crisis is almost entirely due to insufficient building of new houses by the coastal cities: https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/finance/housing-costs/housing-costs.aspx

private social spending (including both mandatory spending, eg employer-sponsored healthcare, and voluntary spending) constitutes ~27.5% of total US consumption of goods and services: https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2018/03/26/the-u-s-spends-far-too-little-on-social-welfare/

Inequality before and after taxes are tightly correlated: https://wir2022.wid.world/www-site/uploads/2022/03/0098-21_WIL_RIM_RAPPORT_A4.pdf

in 2011, the top 1% by wealth of Americans gave only .5% of their wealth to charity, regardless of wealth: http://www.russellsage.org/news/survey-wealthiest-1-and-common-good https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/660097602821423127/Wealthy_Americans_Philanthropy_and_the_Common_Good.pdf

during the Great Depression, private charity rose from ~$10 million to $70 million at its peak (+$60 million increae, 696%); public spending increased from ~$33 million to $1035 million (+$1002 million, 3130%): https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Charity.html#lfHendersonCEE2-022_table_008

there was never a time when the state was uninvolved in helping the needy: https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/32/the-voluntarism-fantasy/ [A] significant amount of research has been done over the past several decades to overturn the myth of a stateless nineteenth century and to rediscover the lost role of the state in the pre-New Deal world. [....] As the political scientist Theda Skocpol has documented, there were also multiple examples of state-issued social insurance programs before the New Deal. In the wake of the Civil War, Congress established an elaborate system of pensions for veterans. At its height in 1910, this de facto disability and old-age pension system delivered benefits to more than 25 percent of all American men over 65, accounting for a quarter of the federal government s expenditures. Between 1911 and 1920, 40 states passed laws establishing mothers pensions for single women with children. These programs provided payments for needy widowed mothers in order to allow them to provide for their children.

public social spending as a percent of total consumption correlates with decreased poverty; private social spending does not: https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2018/03/26/the-u-s-spends-far-too-little-on-social-welfare/

higher social spending correlates with lower inequality: https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2018/03/26/the-u-s-spends-far-too-little-on-social-welfare/

in 2011 in the USA, the top 1% by wealth of Americans gave 6.2% of their donations (.031% of their wealth) to political causes, 6.3% (.0315%) youth development, 7.3 (.0365%) private/community foundations, 7.9% (.0395%) anti-poverty causes, 9.7% (.0485%) arts and culture, 11.6% (.058%) health, 16.3% (.0825%) religious causes, and 22.2% (.111%) to education: http://www.russellsage.org/news/survey-wealthiest-1-and-common-good https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/660097602821423127/Wealthy_Americans_Philanthropy_and_the_Common_Good.pdf

in 2005 in the USA, private charity towards religion and basic needs of the poor decreased with income, while charity towards the arts, education, and health increased with income: https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/5838 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/660113444959158292/giving_focused_on_meeting_needs_of_the_poor_july_2007.pdf

in 2005 in the USA, just 30.3% (upper estimate) of private charity could be focused on meeting basic needs of the poor: https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/5838 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/660113444959158292/giving_focused_on_meeting_needs_of_the_poor_july_2007.pdf

in 2005 in the USA, private charity focused on meeting basic needs of the poor decreased with income from 35% at <$100k/yr to 22% at >$1,000k/yr: https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/5838 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/660113444959158292/giving_focused_on_meeting_needs_of_the_poor_july_2007.pdf

in 2005 in the USA, just 23.9% of religious spending ultimately went to meeting basic needs of the poor: https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/5838 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/660113444959158292/giving_focused_on_meeting_needs_of_the_poor_july_2007.pdf

private charity stays around 2% of GDP: private charity is procyclical -- it declines during recessions and increases during expansions -- meaning that private charity increases recession depth: https://slate.com/business/2014/03/private-charity-and-the-safety-net-why-philanthropy-cant-replace-government.html https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/CharitableGiving_fact_sheet.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/939388847509360730/reich2012.pdf

It is perhaps reassuring that there s no evidence of increasing stinginess in times of need. Then again, neither is there evidence of increased largesse, which is problematic because need is countercyclical. Indeed, because needs increase dramatically as the economy contracts, our reliance on charity and the nonprofit sector contains some built-in structural challenges, at least relative to other countries that can more readily engage in direct governmental spending when additional needs must be met.

in 2008-09, public spending jumped from .1 to 2.2% of GDP: in contrast, automatic stabilizers are countercyclical -- they increase during recessions and decrease during expansions -- meaning that public spending decreases recession depth: https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/32/the-voluntarism-fantasy/ During 2009, while private charity collapsed, automatic stabilizers expanded rapidly, from 0.1 percent of GDP to 2.2 percent of GDP or a number roughly akin to all charitable giving in the United States. This was directly targeted at areas that suffered from the most unemployment, and helped those most in need efforts that, as we ve seen, private charity does only partially. As Goldman Sachs economists concluded, this shift made a crucial difference, and, alongside the government s efforts to prevent the collapse of the banking sector and the Federal Reserve s expansion of monetary policy, was a core reason the Great Recession didn t become a second Great Depression.

even a flat income tax and flat basic income would together be very progressive: https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/bis.2014.9.issue-1-2/bis-2014-0005/bis-2014-0005.pdf

a basic income would grow the economy by 13%: http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Modeling-the-Macroeconomic-Effects-of-a-Universal-Basic-Income.pdf According to the Levy Model, the largest cash program - $1,000 for all adults annually - expands the economy by 12.56% over the baseline after eight years. After eight years of enactment, the stimulative effects of the program dissipate and GDP growth returns to the baseline forecast, but the level of output remains permanently higher.

Calnitsky 2016: compared to welfare recipients, basic income recipients had much lower social stigma: they were much less likely to report problems with the community and less likely to report hiding their status: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cars.12091 https://sci-hub.se/10.1111/cars.12091 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/742557921849901077/939017020249366560/calnitsky2016.pdf

for basic income recipients, hospitalization rates (due to injury etc.) fell by 8.5%: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23050182.pdf

basic income experiments reported increased birth weight, decreased hospitalization time, decreased chronic disease duration: https://jech.bmj.com/content/jech/53/11/725.full.pdf

basic income experiments report increasing child cognitive outcomes: https://unnaturalcauses.org/assets/uploads/file/MoneySchoolingHealth.PDF

children of parents who received a $4,000/yr income boost from a Cherokee casino (similar to a basic income) had significantly lower rates of substance abuse and of psychiatric disorders that persisted to adulthood: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/185890 As adults, significantly fewer Indians than non-Indians had a psychiatric disorder (106 Indians [weighted 30.2%] vs 337 non-Indians [weighted 36.0%]; odds ratio [OR], 0.46; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.30-0.72; P=.001), particularly alcohol and cannabis abuse, dependence, or both. The youngest age-cohort of Indian youth had the longest exposure to the family income. Interactions between race/ethnicity and age cohort were significant. Planned comparisons showed that fewer of the youngest Indian age-cohort had any psychiatric disorder (31.4%) than the Indian middle cohort (41.7%; OR, 0.43; 95% CI, 0.24-0.78; P=.005) or oldest cohort (41.3%; OR, 0.69; 95% CI, 0.51-0.94; P=.01) or the youngest non-Indian cohort (37.1%; OR, 0.66; 95% CI, 0.48-0.90; P=.008).

children of parents who received a $4,000/yr income boost from a Cherokee casino (similar to a basic income) had significantly lower rates of behavioral disorders and higher rates of conscientiousness: https://www.nber.org/papers/w21562.pdf The size of the effects is relatively large; the effect reduces behavioral disorders by 26.7 % of a standard deviation and increases conscientiousness by 42.8 % of a standard deviation.

children of parents who received a $4,000/yr income boost from a Cherokee casino (similar to a basic income) had significantly better behavior, especially those who lived for a longer time period under the income gain: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4846561/ Main effects of race were not significant, but planned comparisons among the 3 age-cohorts showed that the youngest Indian cohort had significantly fewer diagnoses than either of the older cohorts, between whom there were no differences. The youngest Indians also had fewer disorders than the youngest non-Indians. The youngest Indians were significantly less likely to report delinquent friends in adulthood.

amount and type of welfare received by a chicago parent with two children, by income, in Chicago: https://files.illinoispolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Welfare_Report_finalfinal.pdf

the vast majority of welfare is deserved by its recipients: https://www.cbpp.org/research/contrary-to-entitlement-society-rhetoric-over-nine-tenths-of-entitlement-benefits-go-to?fa=view&id=3677

demographics of food stamp recipients: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/12/the-politics-and-demographics-of-food-stamp-recipients/

those on welfare spend much less on education and on food away from home than those not on welfare: https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-2/spending-patterns-of-families-receiving-means-tested-government-assistance.htm

regions with decreased walkability had increased obesity, diabetes, high blood pressure, and heart disease: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214140514000486 https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.jth.2014.06.002

higher density development monotonically decreases the cost of city services by about 4 times: https://usa.streetsblog.org/2015/03/05/sprawl-costs-the-public-more-than-twice-as-much-as-compact-development/ https://usa.streetsblog.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2015/03/Halifax-data.pdf

suburban development requires 2x higher government expenses than urban development: https://usa.streetsblog.org/2015/03/05/sprawl-costs-the-public-more-than-twice-as-much-as-compact-development/ https://institute.smartprosperity.ca/library/publications/infographics-cost-sprawl

suburban sprawl is subsidized by cheap fuel and cheap roads and increases global warming and obesity: https://usa.streetsblog.org/2015/03/05/sprawl-costs-the-public-more-than-twice-as-much-as-compact-development/ https://institute.smartprosperity.ca/library/publications/infographics-cost-sprawl